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ARTICLES
Corporate Issuers Beware: Schering-Plough
and Recent SEC Enforcement Actions
Signal Vigorous Enforcement
of Regulation FD
JON JORDAN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In September 2003, the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC" or "Commission") hit Schering-Plough and its
chief executive officer with the largest civil penalties ever sought against
a corporate issuer and its CEO for violations of Regulation FD. The
one-million dollar penalty against the corporation and fifty-thousand
dollar penalty against the CEO, the first ever against an individual for
violations of the regulation, were signals by the Commission under a
new chairman, William Donaldson, that the regulation was here to stay
and would be vigorously enforced. The Commission's position in
Schering-Plough also stood in sharp contrast to the earlier years of Regulation FD's existence, when the regulation struggled to survive and was
not aggressively enforced.
Enacted in 2000 to end the practice of selective disclosure, where
* Senior Counsel with the Southeast Regional Office of the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission. The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy,
disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The
views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Commission or of the author's colleagues upon the staff of the Commission.
1. Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 48,461, Admin. Proceeding File No.
3-11,249 (Sept. 9, 2003); SEC Files Settled Regulation FD Charged Against Schering-Plough
Corp. and its Former Chief Executive, Litigation Release No. 18,330, Case No. 1:03CV01880
(D.D.C.) (CKK) (Sept. 9, 2003).
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issuers selectively disclose material nonpublic information to securities
analysts and institutional investors, Regulation FD ran into powerful
opposition by the securities industry against the backdrop of a grueling
bear market for which some had considered the regulation partially to
blame. The regulation overcame a strong opposition front, nearly leading to its modification or repeal, to eventually receive nearly unqualified
support from an investment community wary of shady behind-the-scene
deals in light of the Enron debacle and corporate scandals plaguing the
marketplace. This allowed the SEC to move forward with its enforcement agenda in November 2002, when it filed a series of enforcement
actions for violations of the regulation as part of a sweep. In the actions,
the first of their kind concerning violations of the regulation, the Commission gave guidance on what it would look for in pursuing violators of
the regulation and the actions signaled the Commission's willingness to
enforce the rule. Soon thereafter, William Donaldson was named chairman of the SEC, and the investment community braced for a possible
turning back of the rule. Donaldson and the Commission, however,
moved forward with the Commission's enforcement program in the regulation in Schering-Plough.The case involved four times the civil monetary penalties as all of the sweep cases combined, and it was the first of
its kind involving civil penalties against an individual.
This Article will trace the story of Regulation FD and the Commission's battle against the problematic issue of selective disclosure. The
impact of the regulation, both positive and negative, will be explored as
well as the calls for its modification or repeal during its infancy. I then
will discuss the counter-resistance to calls for change to the regulation in
light of corporate scandals in the marketplace. The Regulation FD
enforcement sweep cases will then be laid out in detail, and their significance will be explained. The Article then will explore the controversy
surrounding Donaldson's chairmanship of the SEC and its potential
effect on the regulation. The Schering-Plough enforcement action that
vitiated any concerns regarding the chairman's enforcement of the rule
also will be examined. I next will address what I believe will happen to
the regulation and future enforcement of it. Finally, I will recommend
what corporations should do to avoid such SEC enforcement actions in
the future.

II.

SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE

The Commission promulgated Regulation FD, standing for "Fair
Disclosure," in 2000 as a result of Commission concerns about the prac-
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tice of selective disclosure. 2 Selective disclosure generally refers to the
practice in which issuers of securities "selectively provide material, nonpublic information to certain persons - often, securities analysts or institutional investors - before disclosing this same information to the
public."' 3 While the practice of selective disclosure would appear to be a
violation of the insider trading laws, the United States Supreme Court
did not see it that way in Dirks v. SEC, a case involving an analyst who
selectively disclosed nonpublic information received from a corporate
insider.4 Noting the important role of analysts in "ferret[ing] out and
analyz[ing] information" of corporations, the Court in Dirks held that
insider trading liability would arise only when an insider received a
"personal benefit" from disclosing such information to an analyst.5 The
Dirks case was significant in that it hindered the Commission's ability to
pursue insider trading actions in selective disclosure matters, as it was
difficult to prove the "personal benefit" nexus underlying any prohibited
selective disclosure.6 Nevertheless, despite the limitations imposed by
Dirks, the Commission remained concerned about the problem of selec-

2. See generally Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R §§ 243.100-243.103 (2002); Selective Disclosure
and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release Nos. 34-43, 154 (Aug. 15, 2000) [hereinafter
Approval Release].
3. See Regulation FD: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Ins. and
Gov't Sponsored Enterprises, Comm. on Fin. Serv., 107th Cong. (2001) (written statement of the
SEC [hereinafter SEC Statement to Congress].
4. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). In Dirks, an analyst at a New York broker-dealer
received information from a former officer of a corporation primarily engaged in selling life
insurance and mutual funds that the corporation's assets were overstated as a result of fraudulent
corporate practices. Id. at 648-49. The analyst discussed this information with a number of
clients and investors, allowing those who held securities in the corporation to sell their holdings
before the fraud became public and the stock's value fell. Id. at 649-50. The Commission
charged that the analyst was a "tippee" of the insider, the former officer, and that the analyst had
in turn tipped his clients. Id. At the original hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, the
judge had found that the analyst had aided and abetted violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933 [hereinafter "Securities Act"], § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter
"Exchange Act"], and SEC Rule lOb-5. Id. at 650-51.
5. Id. at 663. The Court thus determined that the corporate insider did not breach a duty
when he disclosed information to the analyst because the insider did not receive a personal benefit
from the disclosure, but was motivated, instead, by a desire to expose a fraud. Id. And therefore,
as the corporate insider had not breached a duty, the analyst in turn did not breach a duty when he
passed along the same information to his clients, since a tippee's duty is "derivative" from the
duty of the tippor. Id. at 667. Consequently, the analyst was found not to have violated the
insider trading laws under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act or Rule lOb-5 thereunder. Id. at 665-67.
6. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Proposed Rules, Exchange Act Release No.
33-7787, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590 (Dec. 28, 1999) [hereinafter Proposed Rule]. Many saw the Dirks
decision as providing protection to insiders who desired to make selective disclosures to analysts,
as well as to the very analysts and their clients who received such selectively disclosed
information. Id. Therefore, there were few insider trading cases based on trading related to
disclosures made to securities analysts. Id.
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tive disclosure. 7 In the face of growing reports that issuers were disclosing nonpublic information to selected securities analysts or institutional

investors, the Commission began to focus attention on the problem,
which Chairman Arthur Levitt referred to as a "stain" on the
marketplace. 8
Concerned that the practice of selective disclosure posed a "serious
threat to investor confidence in the fairness and integrity" of the marketplace, the Commission tried to discern the best way to tackle, via a regulatory response, the issue of selective disclosure.9 One of its options
was to pursue a series of enforcement "test cases" by charging insider
trading in matters involving selective disclosure with the hope of clarifying existing case law in the area.' But the difficult and often unpredictable strategy of "regulation by enforcement" was not viewed as
necessarily the best weapon for tackling the problem, so the Commission decided to go with a rulemaking approach geared toward ending the

problem. "
III.

REGULATION

FD

The Commission's solution to the problem of selective disclosure
came in the form of a novel regulation, Regulation FD. 2 In promulgating Regulation FD, the Commission went with an issuer disclosure rule
for public companies, rather than directly combating the problem by
treating selective disclosure as insider trading under the antifraud laws.
While the goals of the regulation in promoting fair disclosure were honorable, the enactment and eventual adoption of the regulation did not
occur without controversy. The Commission received an outpouring of
public comments during the crafting of the regulation, both positive and
7. See SEC Statement to Congress, supra note 3; Proposed Rule, supra note 6, at 72591-92;
Approval Release, supra note 2, at 51717.
8. Id.; see also SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Remarks at the Economic Club of New York
(Oct. 18, 1999). Chairman Levitt stated that the "behind-the-scenes feeding of material nonpublic information from companies to analyst" was a "stain" on the markets. Id. He felt that "[in
a time when instantaneous and free flowing information is the norm, these sort of whispers" were
"an insult to fair and public disclosure." Id. Chairman Levitt also expressed his disdain for
selective disclosure in an earlier speech at the annual "SEC Speaks" conference in 1998 when he
spoke about his concerns about an "increasingly worrisome form of trading" related to selective
disclosure. See Chairman Arthur Levitt, "SEC Speaks" Conference (Feb. 27, 1998); see also Neal
Lipschutz, SEC Disclosure Rule Seeks FairerMarkets, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 19, 1999, at B5
[hereinafter Lipschutz].
9. See Proposed Rule, supra note 6, at 72,592; SEC Statement to Congress, supra note 3.
10. See id. Such "regulation by enforcement" would have been used to fine-tune the Dirks
decision toward the Commission's position. Id.
11. See id.
12. See generally Approval Release, supra note 2; Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R §§ 243.100243.103 (2002).
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negative, which led to a substantially
revised Regulation FD compared
3

with its originally proposed form.'
A.

Approval of Regulation FD

On August 10, 2000, Regulation FD was officially adopted by the
SEC. '4 Chairman Levitt praised the new regulation, noting that it would
bring "all investors, regardless of the size of their holdings, into the
information loop - where they belong."' 5 However, as expected, while
13. See Approval Release, supra note 2, at 51717; Proposed Rule, supra note 6; News
Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Rule to Ban Selective Disclosure of Material Information; Adopts
Rules to Enhance Audit Comm. Effectiveness (Dec. 15, 1999); Ellen L. Rosen, SEC Takes Aim at
Disclosures, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 27, 1999, at B 1; Sandra Sugawara, SEC Proposes Wider
Disclosure;Analysts, Investors Would get Information at Same Time, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1999,
at E18. The proposed rule immediately received the blessing of individual investors. See Jeff
Brown, Market Players Must be Forced to Share Their Info with the Rest of Us, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Dec. 21, 1999, at K16-17; Lipschutz, supra note 8. It also received condemnation by many in the
securities industry who had the most to lose from the new regulation. See Floyd Norris, Wall
Street Snarls at S.E.C. Proposal on Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1999, at C16; Beth Piskora,
Stop the Whispers-Levitt, N.Y. POST, Dec. 16, 1999, at 44. Of the nearly 6000 comment letters,
the vast majority of the commenters were individual investors who expressed support for the
regulation. See Approval Release, supra note 2, at 51717. These individual investors generally
voiced frustration at the practice of selective disclosure because it put them at a disadvantage in
the marketplace. Id. On the flip side, while most in the securities industry agreed that selective
disclosure was inappropriate and generally supported the Commission's goals on promoting fairer
disclosure, many expressed concerns about the approach the Commission was taking as a means
for dealing with the issue. See Approval Release, supra note 2, at 51717; see also SEC Statement
to Congress, supra note 3. One of the major concerns was that the regulation would have a
"chilling" effect on issuer disclosure practices. See Approval Release, supra note 2, at 51717; see
also SEC Statement to Congress, supra note 3. In response to these concerns, the Commission
made significant changes to the proposed rule in order to narrow the regulation's scope and guard
against any chilling effect. See Approval Release, supra note 2, at 51717; SEC Statement to
Congress, supra note 3.
14. See generally Approval Release, supra note 2; Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R §§ 243.100243.103 (2002); see also Bill Alpert, Fuller Disclosure: SEC Okays Rule to Ban Selective Leaks
Without Curbing Enterprising Sleuths, BARRuON'S, Aug. 14, 2000, at 13; Fred Barbash, SEC
Strikes a Blow for 'Those Kept in Dark,' WASH. PosT, Aug. 20, 2000, at H6; Paul Bird & Paul
Brusiloff, SEC PassesRegulation FD but Heeds Its Critics, INT'L FIN. LAw Rav., Oct. 1, 2000, at
2325, available at 2000 WL 13894031; Dennis J. Black & Jonathan M. Hoff, Regulation FD:
New Rules for Selective Disclosure, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 16, 2000, at 5; Danny Hakim, SEC Approves
Regulation Against Selective Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2000, at C8.
15. See News Release, SEC, Comm. Votes to End Selective Disclosure; Chairman Arthur
Levitt Hails Leveling of Info. Playing Field (Aug. 10, 2000). The Commission in the Approval
Release stated that the regulation was designed to end the practice of selective disclosure and to
maintain confidence in the integrity of the marketplace. See Approval Release, supra note 2, at
51716. In the Approval Release, the Commission stated that it had "become increasingly
concerned about the selective disclosure of material information by issuers." Id. The
Commission added that it was concerned by recent reports that many issuers "were disclosing
important nonpublic information, such as advance warnings or earnings results, to securities
analysts or selected institutional investors, or both, before making full disclosure of the same
information to the general public." Id. As a result, the Commission was concerned that the
"practice of selective disclosure leads to a loss of investor confidence" in the "integrity" of the
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consumer groups and individual investors praised the enactment of the
regulation,16 the securities industry condemned it.' 7 Publicly joining
securities industry criticism of the regulation was Commissioner Laura
Unger, who, in a rare dissent, publicly opposed the adoption of the regulation.' 8 In a prelude of further dissent to come, Commissioner Unger
expressed her opinion that the rule was "broader than the problem" and
that corporate management would "not be sure" what was or was not
material information considered prohibited selective disclosure under
the new rule. 19
B.

Regulation FD

Despite the controversy and extensive comments on the regulation,
the regulation was enacted as a fairly straightforward rule. Regulation
FD generally provides that "whenever an issuer," or person acting on its
behalf, discloses material nonpublic information to certain enumerated

persons (generally securities professionals or holders of issuer securities
who may trade on the basis of the information), that issuer must make

public disclosure of that same information (1) simultaneously, in the
case of an intentional disclosure; or (2) promptly, in the case of a nonintentional disclosure. 2° This general rule against selective disclosure is
limited to disclosures made to the following categories of covered percapital markets. Id. Another threat the Commission intended Regulation FD to address was "the
potential for corporate management to treat material information as a commodity to be used to
gain or maintain favor with particular analysts or investors." Id. at 51716-17. Noting that analysts
"may feel pressured to report favorably about a company or otherwise slant their analysis in order
to have continued access to selectively disclosed information," the Commission stressed that
Regulation FD would prevent any backlash against analysts who publish negative views of an
issuer as they could no longer be excluded by the issuer from calls and meetings to which other
analysts may have been invited. Id. at 51717. The Commission also noted that selective
disclosure "bears a close resemblance" to "ordinary 'tipping' and insider trading," but stated that
"as a result of judicial interpretations, tipping and insider trading can be severely punished under
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, whereas the status of issuer selective
disclosure" had been considerably "less clear." Id.
16. See Fair Disclosue: SEC Rule Puts Small Investors in the Loop, NEWSDAY, Aug. 11,
POST, Aug 20, 2000, at H 1.
17. See Bill Barnhardt, FairDisclosure Rule Dilutes Analyst Advantage, CM. TRIB., Aug. 20,
2000, at C3; Thomas G. Donlan, Editorial Commentary: Phony Fairness, BARRON'S, Oct. 23,
2000, at 78; Beth Piskora, Levitt Slammed for FairDisclosure Rule, N.Y. POST, Aug. 11, 2000, at
35; Ellen L. Rosen, SEC's FairDisclosure Rules Vex the FinancialCommunity, N.Y. L.J., Aug.

2000, at A54; Fred Barbash, Thank SECfor 'FairDisclosure,' WASH.

23, 2000, at 1.
18. See Reg. FD Could Swamp Investors, SEC's Unger Says, INVESTOR RELATIONS Bus.,
Aug. 14, 2000.
19. See Selective Disclosure Rule Gains Approval by Divided SEC, SEC. REG. & L. REP.,
Aug. 14, 2000, at 1089-90 n.32 (quoting SEC Commissioner Laura Unger). Commissioner Unger
was the sole Republican commissioner among Democrats at the time of the adoption of the
regulation. Id.
20. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R § 243.100 (2002); see also Approval Release, supra note 2,
at 51719.
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sons: (1) brokers or dealers; (2) investment advisers; (3) investment
companies; and (4) holders of issuer securities where it is reasonably
foreseeable that such persons will purchase or sell the issuer securities
on the basis of the information. 2' There are four exclusions from coverage under the regulation.2 2 The regulation will not apply to a disclosure

made (1) to a person who owes the issuer a duty of trust or confidence
(i.e. a temporary insider such as an attorney, investment banker, or
accountant); (2) to a person who "expressly agrees" to maintain the

information in confidence; (3) credit ratings organizations; and (4) in
connection with most offerings of securities registered under the Securities Act.2 3 Persons "acting on behalf of an issuer" under the regulation
include "any senior official of the issuer" or "any other officer,
employee, or agent of an issuer who regularly communicates" with any
broker-dealer, investment adviser, investment company or with holders
of the issuer's securities.2 4
A controversial component to the regulation is its application to
disclosures of "material nonpublic" information. While, the regulation
itself does not define the terms "material" and "nonpublic," it relies on
existing definitions of the terms "as established under case law." 26 In
21. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R § 243.100(b)(1) (2000). The first three categories include
"sell side analysts, many buy side analysts, large institutional investment managers, and other
market professionals who may be likely to trade on the basis of selectively disclosed information."
Id. Approval Release, supra note 2, at 51719. Thus the regulation covers the types of persons
"most likely to be the recipients of improper selective disclosure, but should not cover persons
who are engaged in ordinary-course business communications with the issuer, or interfere with
disclosures to the media or communications to government agencies." Id. at 51720.
22. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R § 243.100(b)(2) (2000).
23. Id. The types of securities offerings under the regulation can be found under
§ 243.101(f). Id.
24. Id. § 243.101(c). The regulation is intended to cover "senior management, investor
relations professionals, and others who regularly interact with securities market professionals or
securities holders." See Approval Release, supra note 2, at 51720. A "senior official" means
"any director, executive officer .... investor relations or public relations officer, or other person
with similar functions." Id.
25. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R § 243.100(a) (2000).
26. See Approval Release, supra note 2, at 51721. The Commission provided some guidance
to the materiality issue when adopting the regulation by stating that information was deemed
"material if 'there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important' in making an investment decision." Id. (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). The Commission stated that in order "to fulfill the materiality requirement,
there must be a substantial likelihood that a fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available." Id. The
Commission also noted that "information is nonpublic if it has not been disseminated in a manner
making it available to investors generally." Id. It is important to note that the use of the
materiality standard in the regulation was the subject of many comments leading up to the
adoption of the regulation. Id. Many commenters complained that the general case law definition
of materiality would "cause difficulties for issuer compliance" and was "too unclear" a standard
for issuers to use in making "real time" judgments about disclosures. Id. Such commenters
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the Approval Release, the Commission provided a list of informational
items that should be reviewed carefully for a determination as to
whether they are material.2 7 The Commission especially highlighted

one common concern that involved "the practice of securities analysts
seeking 'guidance' from issuers regarding earnings forecasts."28 The
Commission warned that "when an issuer official engages in a private
discussion with an analyst who is seeking guidance about earnings estimates, he or she takes on a high degree of risk under Regulation FD."29
Another important aspect of the regulation deals with the timing of
required public disclosure once a selective disclosure has been made.
Such timing depends on whether the issuer has made an "intentional" or
"non-intentional" selective disclosure.30 A selective disclosure will be
deemed "intentional" when the person making the disclosure "either
knows, or is reckless in not knowing, that the information he or she is
communicating is both material and nonpublic."3 When there has been
an intentional selective disclosure, the issuer is required to publicly disclose the same information simultaneously. 32 If a selective disclosure
has been made non-intentionally, disclosure of such information must be
made "promptly. 33 The regulation defines "promptly" to mean "as
soon as reasonably practicable (but in no event after the later of 24 hours
or the commencement of the next day's trading on the New York Stock
preferred a bright-line standard of materiality so that materiality judgments could be made without
difficulties. Id.
27. See id. Such items and events included: "(1) earnings information; (2) mergers,
acquisitions, tender offers, joint ventures, or changes in assets; (3) new products or discoveries, or
developments regarding customers or suppliers (e.g., the acquisition or loss of a contract); (4)
changes in control or in management; (5) change in auditors or auditor notification that the issuer
may no longer rely on an auditor's audit report; (6) events regarding the issuer's securities - e.g.,
defaults on senior securities, calls of securities for redemption, repurchase plans, stock splits or
changes in dividends, changes to the rights of security holders, public or private sales of additional
securities; and (7) bankruptcies or receiverships." Id. The Commission, however, cautioned that
"by including this list" it did "not mean to imply that each of these items" was "per se material."
Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. The Commission stated that "[i]f the issuer official communicates selectively to the
analyst nonpublic information that the company's anticipated earnings will be higher than, lower
than, or even the same as what analysts have been forecasting, the issuer likely will have violated
Regulation FD." Id. The Commission further noted that this was "true whether the information
about earnings is communicated expressly or through indirect 'guidance,' the meaning of which is
apparent though implied." Id. An issuer cannot render "material information immaterial simply
by breaking it into ostensibly non-material pieces." Id.
30. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R § 243.100(a)(1)-(2) (2000); Approval Release, supra note 2,
at 51722.
31. Id. § 243.101(a).
32. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R § 243.100(a)(1) (2000). The regulation does not expressly
define the term "simultaneously."
33. Id. § 243.100(a)(2).
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Exchange)" after a senior official of the issuer has learned that there has
been a non-intentional disclosure.34
Another important aspect of the regulation is the type of public

disclosure that will satisfy its requirements once a selective disclosure
has been made. Sufficient public disclosure under the regulation can be
made by filing with the Commission a Form 8-K disclosing the selectively disclosed information.3 5 Alternatively, public disclosure can be

made by disseminating selectively disclosed information "through
another method (or combination of methods) of disclosure that is reasonably designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the
information to the public."'36 The Commission provided guidance on the
alternative methods of public disclosure that it will find acceptable, and
these generally include the use of press releases, press conferences, and
conference calls, either telephonically or through the Internet.3 7 The
intention of the alternative method of public disclosure provision was to
give the issuer considerable flexibility in choosing the means of public
disclosure.3 8
34. Id. § 243.100(d). The regulation defines "promptly" to mean "as soon as reasonably
practicable (but in no event after the later of 24 hours or the commencement of the next day's
trading on the New York Stock Exchange) after a senior official of the issuer ...learns that there
has been a non-intentional disclosure by the issuer or person acting on behalf of the issuer of
information that the senior official knows, or is reckless in not knowing, is both material and
nonpublic." Id.
35. See id. § 243.101(e)(1). Nevertheless, the Commission has stated that "either filing or
furnishing information on Form 8-K solely to satisfy Regulation FD will not, by itself, be deemed
an admission as to the materiality of the information." See Approval Release, supra note 2,at
51723.
36. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R § 243.101(e)(2) (2000).
37. See Approval Release, supra note 2, at 51723-24. Specifically, the Commission stated
that such alternative methods of disclosure include "press releases distributed through a widely
circulated news or wire service, or announcements made through press conferences or conference
calls that interested members of the public may attend or listen to either in person, by telephonic
transmission, or by other electronic transmission (including use of the Internet)." Id. The SEC
stated that "the public must be given adequate notice of the conference or call and the means for
accessing it." Id. at 51724. In noting the flexibility in the alternative methods of public
disclosure, the Commission stated that "the regulation does not require use of a particular method,
or establish a 'one size fits all' standard for disclosure; rather it leaves the decision to the issuer to
choose methods that are reasonably calculated to make effective, broad, and non-exclusionary
public disclosure, given the particular circumstances of that issuer." Id.
38. See id. As such, the regulation was intended to place responsibility on issuers to choose
the "methods that are, in fact, 'reasonably designed' to effect a broad and non-exclusionary
determining
distribution of information to the public." Id. The Commission stated that "[i]n
whether an issuer's method of making a particular disclosure was reasonable," it would "consider
all the relevant facts and circumstances, recognizing that methods of disclosure that may be
effective for some issuers may not be effective for others." Id. A good example of this is the
issuer's posting of new material information on its website. The Commission has cautioned that
an "issuer's posting of new information on its own website would not by itself be considered a
sufficient method of public disclosure." Id. However, it acknowledged that, "as technology
evolves" and "more investors have access to and use the Internet," some issuers, "whose websites
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In the Approval Release, the Commission explicitly stated that
issuers that failed to comply with Regulation FD could be subject to an
SEC enforcement action alleging violations of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Exchange Act and Regulation FD.3 9 The Commission also warned
that, "in appropriate cases," it could also bring an enforcement action

"against an individual at the issuer responsible for the violation, either as
'a cause of the violation in a cease-and-desist proceeding, or as an aider
and abetter of the violation in an injunctive action."4
IV.

IMPACT OF REGULATION

FD

The impact of the regulation on issuer disclosure and marketplace
volatility has been a source of debate between proponents and opponents
of the regulation since its enactment. While there was a short-term, and
expected, impact felt in the marketplace as it adjusted to life under the
new rule, opponents of the regulation complained of longer-term adverse
unintended consequences of the rule.
A.

Companies Strive to Comply with Regulation FD

As the October 23, 2000, effective date of the regulation
approached, issuers, the securities industry and legal counsel strove to
are widely followed by the investment community, could use such a method." Id. In the
Approval Release, the Commission provided the following model, which it believed issuers could
use for making a "planned disclosure of material information such as a scheduled earnings
release." Id. "First, issue a press release, distributed through regular channels, containing the
information; second, provide adequate notice, by a press release and/or website posting, of a
scheduled conference call to discuss the announced results, giving investors both the time and date
of the conference call, and instructions on how to access the call; and third, hold the conference
call in an open manner, permitting investors to listen in either by telephonic means or through
Internet webcasting." Id. The Commission stated that "[b]y following these steps, an issuer can
use the press release to provide the initial broad distribution of the information, and then discuss
its release with analysts in the subsequent conference call, without fear that if it should disclose
additional material details related to the original disclosure it will be engaging in a selective
disclosure of material information." Id.
39. See Approval Release, supra note 2, at 51726. The Commission noted that it could bring
an administrative action seeking a cease-and-desist order, or a civil action seeking an injunction
and/or civil money penalties. Id.
40. Id.; section 21C of the Exchange Act; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3; section 20(e) of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e). It is also important to note that recognizing "that the prospect of private
liability for violations of Regulation FD could contribute to a 'chilling effect' on issuer
communications," the regulation was crafted by the Commission to expressly provide that "no
failure to make a public disclosure required solely" by Regulation FD "shall be deemed to be a
violation of Rule lOb-5." Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R § 240.102 (2000); Approval Release, supra
note 2, at 51726. This provision was included in the regulation to make "clear" that "Regulation
FD does not create a new duty for purposes of Rule lOb-5 liability" and therefore, "private
plaintiffs cannot rely on an issuer's violations of Regulation FD as a basis for a private action
alleging Rule lOb-5 violations. Approval Release, supra note 2, at 51726.
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understand and prepare for compliance with the regulation. 4 ' One of the
most immediate and profound effects of the regulation became an opening up of quarterly conference calls to individual investors.42 This led to

an innovation that allowed a broader dissemination of information than
the traditional telephone conference call: the use of webcasts.4 3 Another

major effect of the regulation was that some corporations reduced or
ended the one-on-one meetings they previously had with analysts."
Yet, despite these dramatic changes in corporate disclosure practices,
uncertainty still prevailed among corporate issuers over the mechanics

of complying with the regulation.45

In a couple of surveys of corporate issuers in the months following
the effective date of the regulation, it became clear that most issuers
were actively attempting to provide full and wide access to their earn-

ings conference calls. In fact, a survey by Thomson Financial/Carson of
publicly traded companies conducted in December 2000 found that
41. See John Coffee, Jr., Tackling New Reg. FD, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 18, 2000, at B6; Paul A.
Ferrillo, Looking at New Regulation FD, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 20, 2000, at 9; Robert Herz, Learning to
Live with Regulation FD, SEC. WK., Oct. 2, 2000, at 8. Some in the industry went so far as to
request an extension of the October 23, 2000, effective date, saying they needed more time to
prepare for compliance with the rule. The National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI) asked the
SEC to extend the effective start date of the regulation from October 23, 2000, to December 29,
2000, in order to give issuers additional time to prepare for compliance with the regulation. See
Daniel Freed, NIRI Requesting Extension on SEC Reg. FD, WALL ST. LETTER, Sept. 25, 2000, at
1, available at 2000 WL 14647496. NIRI President Louis Thompson, who had been traveling
across the country doing "roadshows" to educate issuers on compliance with Regulation FD, felt
that ninety percent of the issuers would not be prepared for compliance by the October 23
effective date. Id. There also was an issue of the effective date's falling in the middle of many
issuer's earnings cycles. Id. The Securities Industry Association (SIA) joined in the NIRI's
request for an extension. See NIRI, SIA Lobby SEC for Reg. FD Delay, INVESTOR RELATIONS
Bus., Oct. 9, 2000. The SEC disregarded these requests and on October 23, 2000, the public
marketplace officially entered the Regulation FD world. See News Release, SEC, SEC Reaffirms
October 23, 2000 Effective Date for Regulation FD (Oct. 12, 2000); SEC Affirms Effective Date of
Regulation FD, SEC TODAY, Oct. 12, 2000, at 1; SEC Rule on Sharing CorporateData to go into
Effect as Planned, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2000, at B2. On the eve of the effective date of
Regulation FD, the SEC issued guidance in the regulation, in the form of a question-and-answer
format, to help address outstanding issues and concerns in the marketplace concerning compliance
with the regulation. See SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin.: Manual of Publicly Avail. Tel. Interpretations,
Fourth Supp. (includes interpretations issued Oct. 2000, Dec. 2000, and May 2001); SEC Staff
Releases Interpretive Guidance for Regulation FD, SEC Release 2000-159, Oct. 19, 2000; SEC
Issues Guidance on Regulation FD, SEC Today, vol. 2000-203, Oct. 23, 2000, at 1.
42. See Jeff D. Opdyke, Individuals Pick Up on Conference Calls, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20,
2000, at Cl. Such conference calls, where management generally gives it views on the company's
performance and future prospects, traditionally had been open only to analysts and institutional
investors. Id.
43. See Grace Delpit, Webcasts May Replace Handshakes: Companies Find Ways to Cope in
a Post-Reg. FD Environment, INVESTOR RELATIONS Bus., Nov. 6, 2000, available at
2000 WL 8692710.
44. See id.
45. See Gregory J. Millman, Reg. FD's Leveling Effect, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Jan. 1, 2001, at
2936.
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nearly half of the companies surveyed had changed the way they were
disclosing information to analysts and investors in light of the regulation
and that most companies were turning to their website and webcasting as
a means of satisfying the regulation.4 6 A survey by the National Inves-

tor Relations Institute (NIRI) found that a majority of companies had
changed the way they were disclosing information, with eighty-nine percent of the public companies surveyed making earnings conference calls
accessible to the public, mostly through Internet broadcast.4 7 Interestingly, in contradiction to fears that Regulation FD would produce a
"chilling effect" on issuer communications, forty-eight percent of the

companies surveyed said they were disclosing the same amount of information to investors compared to before Regulation FD, with twentyeight percent providing more information than before.4 8 Even more surprising, seventy-four percent of the companies surveyed said they were
conducting the same amount of one-on-one private conversations with
analyst as they had before the regulation.49
Despite the initial confusion over the mechanics of complying with
46. See Regulation FD Aftermath: Winners and Losers Begin to Emerge, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan.
17, 2001 [hereinafter Thomson Survey I]. Nearly a third of the companies surveyed reported that
they had limited the flow of information to analysts. Id. More than twenty-one percent of those
surveyed said that they were no longer giving earnings guidance. Id. The survey results were
based on responses from eighty-one companies. Id. Of the eighty percent of companies that made
procedural changes on their disclosure practices in light of Regulation FD, a little over a third
started webcasting their earnings conference calls and ninety-seven percent were publicizing
access to the earnings call through press releases and their websites. Id. More than forty-one
percent began to "simultaneously webcast their presentations at investment banking-sponsored
conferences to the general investor community." Id. Some companies were declining to
participate in such investment banking conferences unless they were allowed to do a live webcast
of their presentations. Id.
47. See Reg FD Study: Most Companies Still Generous with Info, Dow JONES NEWS SERVICE,
Feb. 26, 2001 [hereinafter NIRI Survey I]. This compares to only sixty percent providing such
public access pre-Regulation FD. Id. Most companies were also ensuring that investors knew
how they could tune in to upcoming conference calls: eighty-four percent were notifying investors
through a news release, seventy-five percent were posting notices of such conference calls on their
website and fifty-five percent were using "push technology" in sending out e-mail alerts. Id.
According to the survey, seventy-nine percent of the companies were still providing some form of
earnings guidance, with two-thirds providing such guidance in a news release and a third doing it
through filing with the SEC. Id. More than half of those surveyed said they were updating their
guidance in a news release when material facts or circumstances changed during the quarter. Id.
The survey involved 577 companies of varying sizes, half listed on the New York Stock
Exchange, half trading on Nasdaq. Id. NIRI is a professional association of corporate officers and
investor relations consultants.
48. See id.
49. See id. Nevertheless, the NIRI stated that it did not study the quality of information being
provided, which would later become a focal point regarding a possible adverse impact of the
regulation. Id. For further analysis of the first NIRI Regulation FD survey, see Fred Barbash, The
Earthquake That Didn't Happen, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 2001, at Hl; NIRI Survey Assesses
Results of New SEC 'FD' Regulation, CAPITAL MARKETS REPORT, Feb. 26, 2001; Road to
Comfort with Regulation FD Remains Bumpy, Dow JONES NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 6, 2001.
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Regulation FD, corporate issuers eventually adjusted to the requirements. The use of webcasts became extremely popular as a means of
compliance," and most companies found a way to comply with the regulation by using a combination of webcasts and news releases to provide
public access to conference calls.5 ' These efforts by companies to comply with the regulation were recognized by numerous top officials at the
SEC, who acknowledged that most companies were in good faith seeking to adhere to the regulation. 2
50. See Delpit, supra note 43; NIRI Survey I, supra note 47; Riva Richmond, E-Business:
Video Streaming is a Sleeper Hit with Business Crowd, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2001, at B6;
Thomson Survey I, supra note 46. Webcasting has been deemed an essential and cost-effective
way to reach the most investors. Id. Nevertheless, it should be cautioned that the use of
webcasting by itself does not ensure complete compliance with Regulation FD. See supra note 37
and accompanying discussion. The late Commissioner Paul R. Carey, in testimony before
Congress, warned that web-only disclosure should not supplant the disclosure of material
information through a press release, given that computer ownership or web access was not yet
universal, citing a recent Commerce Department survey that reported that (as of 2001) only 41.5
% of U.S. households had Internet access. See Testimony Concerning Regulation FairDisclosure
Before the House Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Ins. and Gov't Sponsored Enterprises, Comm.
on Fin. Serv., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Paul R. Carey, SEC Comm'r) [hereinafter Carey
Congressional Testimony] As such he viewed "the continuation of the earnings press release
disclosure as transitional, but necessary, disclosure." id.
51. A later survey by the NIRI, conducted in August 2001, verified that all companies had
found a way to comply with the regulation by using webcasts and news releases to provide public
access to conference calls. See NIRI Gives SEC Broad Series of Recommendationsfor Improving
Regulation FairDisclosure;Based on Surveys and Other Input, NIRI Says Primary Objectives of
Regulation FD are Being Met, Bus. WiE, Oct. 23, 2001 [hereinafter NIRI Survey I]. The NIRI
reported that it submitted its recommendations in its second survey to the SEC in response to a
request reportedly made by SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt. Id. The survey found that almost all
companies (ninety-two percent) that were conducting conference calls were webcasting them for
full access to the media and investors. Id. The remaining eight percent of companies were not
conducting conference calls at all. Id. The survey also found that ninety-four percent of the
companies surveyed were using news releases as a means of notifying the public of upcoming
conference calls or other planned issuer presentations that would be webcast. Id. The survey also
said that seventy-nine percent of the companies surveyed issued some form of earnings guidance.
Id. This showed no change from the earlier NIRI survey. Id.; see also supra note 47 and
accompanying discussion. It was somewhat surprising that the survey, like the earlier one by
NIRI, found that only five percent of the responding companies had reduced the number of oneon-one private meetings with analysts and institutional investors, with most continuing to hold the
same number or more meetings than they had held before Regulation FD became effective. Id.
Another tool used by some companies to comply with the regulation included the increased use of
confidentiality agreements with the analyst or institutional investor that the companies are
providing information to. See Phyllis Plitch, Companies' Widening Use of 'Gag' Option in FairDisclosure Rule Draws Criticism, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2001, at CIO. Some companies had also
switched to monthly, as opposed to quarterly, reporting as a means of getting current information
out into the marketplace. See Christopher Oster, After Reg FD, Progressive Sets Bold Move,
WALL ST. J., May 11, 2001, at CI.
52. David Martin, the Director of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance, said he was
"very pleased" by what the Commission had been "seeing so far," noting that issuers were
"making a big effort to get it right." See Early Today: Businesses Adjusting to Life with
Regulation FD, Which Requires Full Disclosure of News to Public (CNBC television broadcast,
Mar. 8, 2001), available at 2001 WL 22705810 (quoting SEC Division of Corporation Finance
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Criticisms and Alleged Unintended Consequences
of Regulation FD

As issuers and the securities industry became comfortable with
compliance with the regulation, criticisms concerning certain unintended
adverse consequences of the rule began to surface. These criticisms
would contribute to an opposition movement calling for modification or
repeal of the regulation.

1.

CHILLING EFFECT ON THE QUANTITY AND
QUALITY OF INFORMATION

One of the primary fears in the crafting of the regulation involved a
possible "chilling effect" the new rule might have on issuer disclosure.5 3
The securities industry was concerned that issuers would hesitate to disclose corporate information, fearing that doing so would cause them to
run afoul of the regulation. 54 The Commission recognized this concern
and was careful to craft the regulation so as not to exacerbate it.55 Nevertheless, as soon as the regulation became effective, many in the securities industry complained that issuers were becoming tight-lipped in
regard to the kind of information that analysts had previously relied on
in projecting earnings.5 6 As surveys began to show that the quantity of
information being provided by issuers had not necessarily decreased as a
result of the regulation,5 7 critics then began to argue that the quality, as
opposed to quantity, of information had diminished as a result of the
Director David Martin). Richard Walker, the Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, also
noted that companies were "applying good faith and working hard to meet the requirements" of
Regulation FD. See SEC Believes Most Companies Try to Comply with Reg. FD, SEC. REG. & L.
REP., Apr. 23, 2001, at 586 n.16. Walker went on to say that "on balance" the regulation had been
"very successful." Id.
53. Aaron Lucchetti & Christopher Oster, Mum's the Word in Wake of Disclosure Rule,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2000, at C I.
54. Id.
55. See supra note 13 and accompanying discussion.
56. See Robert McGough & Robert Guy Matthews, The Big Chill: Street Feels Effect of 'Fair
Disclosure' Rule, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2000, at C 1. There were some accounts of companies
canceling one-on-one meetings with analysts. See Jeff D. Opdyke, Wall Street Feels the Effect of
'FairDisclosure' Regulation, WALL ST. J.-EuRo, Oct. 24, 2000, at 26. In a speech before the SIA
on the impact of the regulation, Richard Walker, the SEC's Director of Enforcement at the time,
expressed his belief that any chilling effect could have been the result of a temporary "overabundance of caution" on the part of issuers that were responding to "dire predictions" by some
law firms that had opposed the regulation. See Walker Addresses Enforcement Issuers Under New
Regulation FD, SEC TODAY, vol. 2000-213, Nov. 6, 2000, at 1 (quoting SEC Director of
Enforcement Richard Walker).
57. See NIRI Survey I, supra note 47 and accompanying discussion, NIRI Survey II, supra
note 51 and accompanying discussion; Thomson Survey I, supra note 46 and accompanying
discussion; see also Cheryl Winokor Munk, SEC Disclosure Rule Dims Appeal of Conferences,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2001, at C16.
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regulation.5 8 While some in the securities industry acknowledged that
issuers were putting out the same or more information as before the
regulation, they complained that the depth of nonmaterial information
being provided was not the same as before the regulation.5 9
While the Commission expressed concerns about the possible chilling effect of the regulation, 60 many proponents of the rule felt that analysts and institutional investors were complaining simply because they
no longer had access to the material nonpublic information they had had
in the past. 6 ' Proponents of the regulation claimed that the rule was
working just as it was intended in preventing the selective dissemination
62
of material nonpublic information.
2.

LESS ACCURACY IN ANALYST FORECASTS

Another criticism of the regulation was that it resulted in less accurate forecasts by analysts. 63 Because analysts no longer had access to
selectively disclosed earnings guidance from issuers, analysts' earnings
estimates, which usually clustered around a tight predictable range, were
58. See id.
59. See id. For many in the securities industry, both quantity and quality were issues. Id. In
a survey released by the Association of Investment Management and Research (AIMR), fiftyseven percent of the analysts and portfolio managers surveyed said that the volume of substantive
information released by issuers had decreased since the regulation. See Analyst, Portfolio
Managers Say Volume, Quality of Information Have Fallen Under Regulation FD,AIMR Member
Survey Shows, Bus. WIRE, Mar. 26, 2001. The same survey found that fifty-six percent of those
surveyed felt that the quality of information disclosed had decreased as well. Id.; see also Judith
Bums, Analysts Report Loss Information in Wake of Regulation FD, FEDERAL FILINGS
NEwswIRas, Mar. 26, 2001; Joel Chemoff, Clamming Up: Reg FD Leads to Less Disclosure, not
More, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Apr. 2, 2001, at 8; Reg FD has Squelched Info Flow, Survey
Says, WALL ST. LETr R, Apr. 2, 2001, at 4.
60. See Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., Emerging Issues under the Federal Securities Laws, D.C. BAR
CORPORATION, FINANCE & SECURITIES LAW SECTION (May 15, 2001). Commissioner Hunt said
that "[c]oncerns remain . . . that Regulation FD may chill communications . . . [as many]
[c]ompanies may choose not to disclose material information that before [they] had disclosed only
to the analyst community." Id.
61. See Phyllis Plitch, Reg FD Boosters Take Issue with Wall Street's Findings, Dow JONES
NEWS SERVICE, May 17, 2001.
62. See id. Harvey Goldschmid, the SEC's General Counsel who helped draft the regulation,
said, "[T]here may be validity in analysts['] saying they're getting less information, but clearly
some of that shortfall is of a kind the SEC properly meant to eliminate - hard-core material
information." Id. (quoting SEC General Counsel Harvey Goldschmid). An academic study by the
University of Southern California and Purdue University also found that the regulation had not
harmed the flow of information to the markets. See Regulation FD Does Not Harm Markets, Says
USC Report, Bus. WIRE, July 23, 2001. See also infra notes 124-29 and accompanying
discussion; Phyllis Plitch, Reg FD Study: The Regulation Has Not Harmed Flow of Info, Dow
JONES NEWS SERVICE, July 23, 2001.
63. See D. Casey Kobi, Wall Street v. Main Street: The SEC's New Regulation FD and Its
Impact on Market Participants,77 IND. L.J. 551, 588 (2002).
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more widely dispersed than before the regulation.64 As a result, the
argument went, analysts' earnings predictions became less accurate.65

3.

VOLATILITY

The greatest criticism of the regulation, and the hardest-felt in the
marketplace, was that it led to greater volatility in the markets.6 6 The
argument went that there was a domino effect: A chilling in issuer disclosure resulted in less accurate analysts' earnings estimates, and thus
more earnings surprises. The earnings surprises, in turn, led to greater
volatility in the stock market when issuers' earnings numbers came
oUt. 6 7 This increase in price fluctuations, it was argued, was a result of

the surprise factor, coupled with the fact that everyone in the market
could now react to disclosed information at the same time, as opposed
when only the privileged few could preliminarily react.6 8
Volatility was one of the major concerns cited by Commissioner
Unger in her dissent to adoption of the rule. 69 And long after adoption
of the rule, many in the securities industry and the investing public continued to express concerns about the regulation's contribution to volatility. 70 While it is conceivable that the regulation may have had a shortterm impact on volatility as issuers and the securities industry sought to
64. See Robert McGough & Cassell Bryan-Low, Analysts' Earnings Estimates Are
Diverging, and SEC Disclosure Rule May Be the Reason, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2000, at C2. A
study by BulldogResearch, a firm that tracks the performance of analysts in predicting earnings,
found that analysts' estimates became more dispersed with a widening standard deviation centered
around an average estimate. Id.
65. See id. The study found that the actual accuracy of the analyst' estimates decreased by
5.3%. Id. The study compared earnings estimates for companies that reported earnings in the
second quarter of 2000 with earnings estimates of companies that reported third quarter earnings
through October 24, 2000. Id.
66. See Thomas G. Donlan, Phony Fairness: Reg. FD Will Hurt Markets and Investors,
BARRON'S, Oct. 23, 2000, at 8.
67. See Molly Williams & Robert McGough, Intel's Jolt Shows Shifts in Market's Dynamics,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2000, at Cl. In one of the first earnings surprises just prior to the effective
date of Regulation FD, the effects of which was thought to have been contributed to by the
impending regulation, Intel shocked the market by reporting weaker-than-expected revenue,
causing its shares to drop twenty-two percent in one day. Id.
68. See Daniel Gross, A Little Democracy on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2000, at Al.
The stock market was perceived as being as "stable as an earthquake zone." Id.
69. See infra note 82 and accompanying discussion; see also SEC Acting Chairman Laura S.
Unger, Fallout from Regulation FD: Has the SEC Finally Cut the Tightrope?, Remarks at the
Glasser Legal Works Conference on SEC Regulation FD, New York, New York (Oct. 27, 2000),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch421.htm. Noting the recent plunge in Intel's
stock price by twenty-two percent in one day, Commissioner Unger felt that "[i]f increased
volatility is one of the consequences of Regulation FD, then investors and their confidence in the
marketplace could be damaged." Id.
70. See Len Boselovic, Reg. FD Opens Door to Information, Critics, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, Apr. 23, 2001, at Bi; Jeff D. Opdyke, How Much Are Stocks Hurtingfrom Recent Rash
of Profit Preannouncements Tied to New Rule?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2001, at Cl.
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comply with the rule, it is disputable whether the regulation has had any
long-term impact on volatility, since the marketplace has had the opportunity to adjust to the regulation's requirements. 7 ' Nevertheless, suspicions that the regulation contributed to volatility led to calls for, and
nearly brought about, change in the regulation.7 2
4.

ANALYSTS WORKING HARDER

Another criticism of the regulation, and one met with little sympathy by individual investors, was that it forced analysts to work harder.
Analysts, who had previously been privy to selective guidance by issuers, were now required to do more of the homework and legwork needed
to actively project future earnings estimates. 7 3 While analysts found this
particularly burdensome, many investors believed that forcing analysts
to work and dig harder for information was not necessarily a bad thing.
Rather, it caused many mutual fund companies to enhance their research
capabilities into the companies they were investing in, placing less reliance on analysis provided by securities firms. 74 It also allowed the hardest working and best analysts to stand out, as their hard work, rather than
71. There was some dispute as to whether the regulation had indeed increased volatility in
share prices. It was reported that an internal SEC study on the regulation's effects on volatility
found no discernible change in volatility since Regulation FD took effect. See Judith Burns, SEC
Study Finds No Impact on Market Volatility from Regulation FD, Dow JONES NEWS SERVICE,
Mar. 15, 2001. The study reportedly was requested by then Acting SEC Chairman Laura Unger
over the objections of SEC economists. Id. A large-scale formal empirical study conducted by
the University of Southern California and Purdue University also found no evidence of increased
volatility as a result of the regulation. See Regulation FD Does Not Harm Markets, Says USC
Report, supra note 62. "In fact, the evidence reveals a slight reduction in return volatility around
earnings announcements since Regulation FD." Id.; see also Plitch, supra note 62. Furthermore,
seventy-four percent of corporate leaders in a survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers
reported no impact from the regulation on the volatility of their respective companies' stock
prices. See Neal Lipschutz, Point of View: Corp. Execs Give Reg FD OK 1 Year Later, Dow
JONES NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 17, 2001. A little over six months after the effective date of the
regulation, even then-Acting SEC Chairman Unger testified before Congress that it was
impossible to draw any correlation between the regulation and market volatility. See Testimony
Concerning Regulation Fair Disclosure Before the House Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Ins.,
and Gov. Sponsored Enterprises,Comm. on Fin. Services, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Laura
S. Unger, SEC acting Chairman) [hereinafter Unger Congressional Testimony].
72. See Neal Lipschutz, Point of View: Don't Blame Reg FD for Stocks' Fall, Dow JONES
NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 13, 2001. For a discussion of moves to reform the regulation in light of
criticisms concerning, among other things, volatility, see infra notes 77-114 and accompanying
discussion.
73. See Jeff D. Opdyke & Emily Nelson, Conference-Call Crunch: New SEC Rule Turns
Analysts' Rite Into a Hectic Affair, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2000, at Cl; Kathleen Pender, SEC's
Regulation FD Should Force Analysts To Do Homework, S.F. CHRON, Aug. 11, 2000, at B1;
David Wells, Analysts out in the Field Thanks to Disclosure Rule: Regulation FD Forces
Emphasis on Anecdotal Research, NAT'L POST, June 25, 2001, at C9.
74. See Allison Bishey Colter, Fund Firms Strengthen Research Teams, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2,
2001, at Cl9. Many mutual-fund companies beefed up their research departments in order to
become less dependent on analysts. Id.
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inside connections, set them apart from the rest of the pack.75
Despite the criticisms of chilling, less accuracy, volatility, and more
work for analysts, many viewed these as minor costs compared to the
benefits of the regulation. Nevertheless, all of these criticisms played a
major role in securities industry efforts to overturn or severely weaken
the regulation, as debate over the impact and harmful unintended consequences of the regulation began to intensify.7 6

V.

Focus TOWARD

MODIFICATION OR REPEAL OF THE REGULATION

Soon after enactment of the regulation came an economic and political environment hostile to the rule. The bear market continued to
worsen, with many blaming the regulation for exacerbating the decline,
and a change into a more business-friendly Republican administration
provided more power to traditional opponents of the rule. This led to a
major refocus on the regulation, including public hearings before Congress. The future of the regulation was in jeopardy, even though it was

only in its infancy.
A.

Scapegoatfor Market Downturn

As the greatest bull market in history soured into bear territory after
the adoption of Regulation FD, many asked whether the regulation itself
was a cause of, or contributor to, the spiraling stock market.77 The chil75. See Jeff D. Opdyke, Check Please: Some Stock Analysts Get Back to Basics in Wake of
Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 2001, at Al; Williams & McGough, supra note 67. One of the
first analysts recognized for making the right call due to hard work was Ashok Kumar with US
Bancorp Piper Jaffray, who downgraded shares of Intel to the anger and dismay of many money
managers shortly before Intel shocked Wall Street with its revenue earnings shortfall that
precipitated a twenty-two percent decline in the stock in one day. Id.
76. See infra notes 77-114 and accompanying discussion. One other criticism of the
regulation not given as much focus within the Article, but which is still important to note, involves
the regulation's effect on small issuers. Some small companies have complained that the
regulation hampered their ability to attract analysts to their businesses. See SEC May Tinker with
Reg. FD: Disclosure Needs To Be More "Comfortable," Unger Says, INVESTOR RELATIONS Bus.,
Apr. 30, 2001. As many smaller companies do not have the resources and the type of "fine-tuned
disclosure practices in place to deal" with the regulation as their larger counterparts do, they are
more concerned about running afoul of the regulation and find it more difficult to disclose certain
information. Phyllis Plitch, Reg FD Said to Add to Small Cos' Burden Wooing Analysts, Dow
JONES NEWS SERVICE, May 4, 2001. As a result, it can often be more difficult for an analyst to
cover such small companies, with many analysts opting not to bother covering them at all. Id.; see
also Steven Anderson, Reg FD Proves to be a Nightmare for In-House Counsel, CORPORATE
LEGAL TIMEs, Aug. 2001, at 57. Both Commissioners Hunt and Unger have voiced their concerns
on the potential harsher effects the regulation may have had on issuers and promised to closely
monitor the effect of the regulation on small issuers in contemplating possible future changes to
the rule. See Rachel Witmer, Unger Says SEC Will Monitor Reg FD; Too Soon to Assess its
Effectiveness, SEC. REG. & L. REP., May 21, 2001, at 753, 754.
77. See David Andelman, Open Info Blamed: Stocks Hurt by Heavy Disclosure, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Mar. 10, 2001, at 41.
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ling effect of the regulation and the volatility in share prices were
thought by some to have contributed indirectly to the market's decline.7 8

To make matters worse, the SEC's Acting Chairman under the incoming
Bush government, Laura Unger, inflamed these suspicions by publicly
claiming that there seemed "to be a correlation between the quality of
information under" the regulation "and the drop in tech stocks."7 9 This

attention to the regulation as a source of negative influence on the stock
market drew widespread scrutiny, as the stock market's decline
impacted virtually all investors, large and small, and not just those in the

securities industry.8"
B.

Hostile Power Environment at the SEC

When Regulation FD was promulgated, Arthur Levitt headed up a
Commission that was largely in favor of it. The lone dissenter at the
time was Laura Unger, the sole Republican on a Commission with three
Democrats. 8 ' While Unger was unable to prevent adoption of the regulation, she went on to criticize it and promised to monitor any unin82
tended consequences it might have.
78. See id.
79. Neil Roland, SEC Chief to Enforce Standard; Unger has Repeatedly Criticized FairDisclosure Rule, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2001, at E3 (quoting Acting Chairman Laura Unger).
Unger made the comment to a University of Cincinnati audience following a speech at the
university. See SEC Acting Chairman Laura S. Unger, Raising Capital on the Internet, Remarks
at the 2001 Corporate Law Symposium, University of Cincinatti School of Law (Mar. 9, 2001),
available at 2001 WL 302824.
80. See Adelman, supra note 77. Nevertheless, some saw the advent of Regulation FD with
the declining stock market as more of a coincidence than a causal relationship. See Lipschutz,
supra note 72.
81. See Selective Disclosure Rule Gains Approval by Divided SEC, supra note 19, at 1089.
82. See Regulation FD Could Swamp Investors, SEC's Unger Says, INVESTOR RELATIONS
Bus., Aug. 14, 2000, available at 2000 WL 8692594. At a speech only days after the October 23,
2000, effective date of the regulation, Commissioner Unger promised to be a "watchdog for any
unintended consequences of Regulation FD." See SEC Acting Chairman Laura S. Unger, Fallout
from Regulation FD: Has the SEC Finally Cut the Tightrope?, Remarks at the Glasser
LegalWorks Conference on SEC Regulation FD, New York, N.Y. (Oct. 27, 2000) available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch421.htm [hereinafter Unger Oct. 27, 2000 Speech]. In the
speech, she said she dissented from the adoption of the regulation because she: (1) thought the rule
was unnecessary; (2) was concerned about issuers' scaling back on disclosure; and (3) was
concerned about the quality of the information in light of the regulation. Id. As a watchdog for
any unintended consequences of the regulation, she promised to (1) closely monitor studies by the
SEC, SIA and others on the effectiveness of the regulation in reducing selective disclosure as well
as the impact of the regulation in "chilling" of "corporate communications, market volatility and
any disproportionate effect on smaller issuers;" (2) "[e]ncourage the staff and other
commissioners to provide more guidance regarding the practices that are of concern to the
Commission and those that are not;" (3) "[find ways to facilitate 'public' dissemination of
material nonpublic information through the Internet, and make sure that Regulation FD doesn't
discourage the use of technology as a means of public dissemination;" and (4) "[slcrutinize staff
recommendations on enforcement matters so that Regulation FD will be applied fairly and
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Things changed with the election of George W. Bush, when a business-friendly Republican Party gained control of three of the five seats
on the Commission, including the prized chairmanship. Soon thereafter,
the regulation's biggest proponent, Levitt, resigned, leaving the regulation's biggest opponent, Unger, the next Acting Chairman.8 3 In departing, Levitt warned that efforts might be undertaken to repeal the
regulation.84 So it came as little surprise that, upon Unger's taking over
as Acting Chairman, she immediately began intensively focusing on the
regulation and considering possible modifications or repeal of it.85 In

one of the first major initiatives by the very same commissioner who
"bet [her] house" that the regulation would not work,8 6 and who has
been credited with joking that Regulation "FD" stood for "Flawed Disclosure,"8' 7 "Frequently Disregarded," 8' 8 "Fully Dysfunctional," 8 9 and
"Fundamentally Dumb,"9 0 Unger announced plans to closely monitor
the regulation and hold a public roundtable to discuss any adverse consequences it might have had. 9
C.

Roundtable on Regulation FD

On April 24, 2001, in the heart of Wall Street, the SEC hosted a
public roundtable discussion on Regulation FD moderated by Acting
Chairman Unger ("Roundtable").9 2 The public discussion was divided
judiciously." Id; see also Jeff Goldfarb, Unger Pledges to Keep Close Watch on Regulation FD
Effects, SEC. REG. & L. REP., Nov. 6, 2000, at 1517.
83. See Floyd Norris, Levitt to Leave the S.E.C. Early; Bush to Pick 4, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21,
2000, at C I.
84. See id.
85. See What's New in the Land of Regulation?, Remarks by Acting Chairman Laura S.
Unger, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, at the SEC Speaks in 2001, The Practising
Law Institute, Washington D.C. (Mar. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Unger, Mar. 2, 2001, Speech];
Roland, supra note 79, at E3.
86. See Unger Oct. 27, 2000 Speech, supra note 82. In the speech, Unger said that "the
Commission bet the store that Regulation FD would work.., but I bet my house that it won't!"
Id.
87. See Unger Congressional Testimony, supra note 71.
88. See Paul R. La Monica, R.I.P., Reg FD? Some Companies Still Don't Know the Meaning
of FairDisclosure, THE RED HERRING, June 1, 2001, at 80.
89. See id.
90. See id.; see also Business Adjusting to Life with Reg FD, Which Requires Full Disclosure
of News to Public, CNBC: EARLY TODAY Mar. 8, 2001 (quoting Acting Chairman Laura Unger).
91. See Unger Mar. 2, 2001, Speech, supra note 85; see also Unger to Convene SEC
Roundtables on FinancialPortals,SEC. REG. & L. REP., Mar. 19, 2001, at 399.
92. In early April 2001, the SEC announced that it would be hosting a public roundtable
discussion on Regulation FD to be moderated by Acting Chairman Unger. See SEC Announces
Agenda and List of Participants for Regulation FD Roundtable, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission News Release, SEC 01-35, Apr. 12, 2001. In the announcement Unger stated that
she "expected[ed] a vigorous and enlightening dialogue that will provide [the Commission] ...
with a first hand look at how Regulation FD has impacted disclosure and changed the information
landscape." Id. See also Judith Bums, SEC's Unger Says Reg. FD Roundtable Is for 'Fact-
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into four categories of persons affected by the regulation: analysts, issuers, individual investors, and the press.
As expected, analysts at the Roundtable complained about the regu-

lation, claiming it had a chilling effect on disclosure, which in turn hurt
their ability to analyze relevant corporate data. 93 Issuers, on the other
hand, expressed not so much opposition to the regulation, but confusion
by it. The issuer panel noted a lack of consistency among their corporate legal departments on how to handle disclosure issues, 94 and recommended that the SEC provide more guidance on how companies should
apply the rule. 95 On the opposite end of the spectrum from the analyst
community was the panel of individual investors, who were happy with
the regulation, as it provided them access to more information than they
had ever had before.96 The panel of representatives from the press also
praised the regulation, as it opened to them valuable corporate information that they too had been shut out from.97 While there were differing
opinions concerning the consequences of the regulation, one opinion
won a consensus: At only six months after the effective date, it was too
early to judge the full impact of the regulation.9 8 Nevertheless, Acting
Chairman Unger and Commissioner Hunt both expressed a willingness
to consider further guidance and possible modifications to the rule furFinding,' Dow JONES NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 12, 2001. Unger opened the Roundtable by explaining
that it was part of her commitment to monitor Regulation FD. See Acting Chairman Laura S.
Unger, Opening Remarks at the SEC Roundtable Discussion on Regulation FD at the U.S.
Securities & Exchange Commission, New York, N.Y. (Apr. 24, 2001), available at http://www.
sec.gov/news/speech/spch479.htm.
93. See Carol Vinzant, Brokerage Firms Target Disclosure Rule, WASH. PosT, Apr. 25, 2001,
at ElO.
94. See Jeff D. Opdyke, Wall Street, SEC Discuss 'Reg FD' at Roundtable, WALL ST. J., Apr.
25, 2001, at C16. The conflicting opinions of the legal departments had resulted in issuers'
confusion and apprehension about the regulation. Id.
95. See Shanon D. Murray, SEC Could Revisit Reg FD, THE DAILY DEAL, Apr. 25, 2001.
96. See Neal Lipschutz, Point of View: Reg FD Debate Heats Up, But Rule Works, Dow
JONES NEWS SERVICE,

Apr. 27, 2001. One head of an individual investor organization claimed

that he had not "met an individual investor who [was not] delighted with Regulation FD." Id.
(quoting John Markese, President of the American Association of Individual Investors).
97. See Reporters Give Reg. FD Thumbs Up, INVESTOR RELATIONS Bus., Apr. 30, 2001.
Floyd Norris, Chief Financial Correspondent for the New York Times, said that the regulation was
a boon for journalists; before the regulation he had been "kicked out of conferences, lied to by
companies and refused access to conference calls, which [had] meant [that he] had to rely on
third-party information from analysts." Id.
98. See Jeffrey Goldfarb, Industry Participants Want SEC to Issue Guidance on Regulation
FD, SEc. REG. & L. REP., Apr. 30, 2001, at 137. In fact, some urged the Commission to refrain
from taking any action with respect to the regulation, at least until more could be learned through
time. Id. This sentiment echoed a comment by Levitt only days before the Roundtable when, in a
speech at UBS Warburg's Global Financial Services Conference, Levitt cautioned that it was too
early to judge the regulation. See Chad Bray, Former SEC Chairman: It's Too Early to Tell on
Reg FD, Dow JONES NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 23, 2001.
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ther down the road.9 9
D.

CongressionalHearings

Renewed industry and public focus on the regulation eventually led
to congressional hearings on the rule. "1 ° Providing testimony before

Congress on behalf of the SEC were Acting Chairman Unger, Commissioner Hunt, Commissioner Paul Carey (via written testimony), and the
SEC itself.' 0 1 Also included in the hearings were witnesses representing
the securities industry and individual investors.' °2
At the hearing, Unger stressed several important factors and issues3
0
with respect to the regulation based on her findings at the Roundtable.1
First and most important, she said, there was clear consensus in the marketplace that it was too soon to judge the effectiveness of the regulation."0 Second, she stated that the regulation had increased the quantity
of information provided by issuers, yet the regulation's impact on the
quality of such information was still uncertain.' 0 5 Third, she stressed
that there was a need for more guidance on compliance with the regulation, especially insofar as how to deal with materiality issues. 0 6 Fourth,
she noted that there was a need for more information dissemination tools
that could be used to comply with the regulation." 7 Finally, she testified that the regulation could not be tied to volatility in the marketplace."0 8 Commissioner Hunt echoed Unger's sentiments, saying it was
too early to judge the effects of the regulation, and promising to closely
99. See Phyllis Plitch, SEC Eyes Regulation FD, Will Explore Further 'Guidance,' Dow
NEws SERVICE, Apr. 24, 2001. This included possible further guidance on the definition of
materiality in the regulation or the issuance of "best practices" guidelines for the industry. Id.
100. See Congress May Look into Reg. FD, INVESTOR RELATIONS Bus., May 14, 2001; SEC's
Unger to Testify at Regulation FD Hearing Thursday, Dow JONES NEWS SERVICE, May 15, 2001.
Hearings on Regulation FD were officially conducted by the U.S. House of Representatives'
Financial Services Committee's Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government
Sponsored Enterprises. Id. Representative Richard Baker, Chairman of the subcommittee, stated
that the hearings would focus on whether the rule was accomplishing its goals and whether it
resulted in any unintended consequences involving a reduction in disclosure. Id.
101. See id.
102. See id. Among those testifying were witnesses representing the Securities Industry
Association, the Motley Fool, and others in the securities industry. Id.
103. See Unger Congressional Testimony, supra note 71. Unger planned to issue a report on
her findings from the Roundtable in the future. Id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. Unger said that "the rules of the self-regulatory organizations, particularly the
NYSE and NASD... limit the methods of dissemination otherwise allowed by Reg FD." Id.
108. See id. In concluding her testimony, Unger generally opined that more time was needed
to assess the effectiveness of the regulation and promised that the SEC would continue to monitor
the effects of the regulation. Id.
JONES
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monitor the rule."° Commissioner Carey likewise voiced his opinion
that it was too early to judge the impact of the regulation, but noted that
he had seen "many positive signs" that the regulation was "working

amazingly well." 110
The SIA and other critics of the rule testifying at the hearings were
vehement about the need for changes in the regulation, some calling for
further guidance, one even calling for abolishment of the rule altogether."t Individual investors and proponents of the rule, on the other
hand, urged that the regulation remain intact and be stringently
2
enforced. 11
After hours of conflicting testimony, members of Congress said
3
they were more confused than ever about the impact of the regulation."
Nevertheless, consensus among members generally coalesced around the
SEC's position that further study was needed before any changes in the
4
rule should be undertaken. 1

109. See Testimony Concerning Regulation FairDisclosure, Before the Subcomm. on Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the House Comm. on Financial
Services, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Isaac C. Hunt, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission) [hereinafter "Hunt Congressional Testimony"]. Hunt also testified that he
remained concerned about the chilling effect of the regulation. Id.
110. See Carey Congressional Testimony, supra note 50. Carey did not appear at the hearing,
but provided written testimony. Id.
111. See Judith Bums, SEC Says Too Soon to Tell ifRegulation FD Is a Success, Dow JONES
NEws SERVICE, May 17, 2001. James Glassman, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise
Institute, strongly felt that regulators should not "study it for two years" or attempt to modify it,
but should simply "abolish it." Id. The SIA submitted a survey it had conducted at the
congressional hearing, which stressed that "69% of 'sell-side' analysts, those who produce buy
and sell recommendations for brokerage firms, say Reg FD had adversely affected the advice they
provide to clients." Jeff D. Opdyke, Rule of FairDisclosure Hurts Analyst, House Subcommittee
Is Told at Hearing, WALL ST. J., May 18, 2001, at C15. The SIA sought modifications to the
regulation that would "clarify materiality and protect analysts from liability." See Bums, supra
note 111. Sell-side analysts work for brokers and dealers who sell securities, while buy-side
analysts typically work for mutual funds and pension funds that do in-house research. See Paula
Span & Ben White, The Market Scholars' Star Turn, A Blurring of the Lines Produced Troubling
Conflicts, WASH. PosT, Nov. 15, 2002, at Al, A18. The SIA survey was criticized by some
investor groups, including some that said that the "SIA was extremely biased against FD and in
favor of selective disclosure." Phyllis Plitch, Reg FD Boosters Take Issue with Wall Street's
Findings, Dow JONES NEWS SERVICE, May 17, 2001 (quoting John Markese, President of the
American Association of Individual Investors). David Becker, the SEC's General Counsel, also
criticized the SIA survey, noting that it contained the "subjective impressions" of analysts and
stating that "as a serious analysis of the rule... it fails." See Judith Bums, SEC Official Says Too
Early to Judge Regulation FD, Dow JONES NEws SERVICE, May 30, 2000.
112. Id. Individual investors and proponents of the rule were mainly represented by Thomas
Gardner, co-founder of the Motley Fool. Id.
113. See Bums, supra note 111.
114. See id.; see also Witmer, supra note 76, at 753.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

VI.

[Vol. 58:751

CORPORATE SCANDALS AND RENEWED SUPPORT
FOR THE REGULATION

As calls for repeal or modification of the regulation began to intensify and become more of a real possibility under Unger's tenure as Acting Chairman, a counter-resistance to the regulation's opponents began
to build. By the time the Enron scandal blew up, causing a massive loss
of investor confidence in the marketplace, the rule had received nearly
unqualified support from the investment community, and the analyst

industry was powerless to resist it any further.
A.

Counter-Resistance in Support of the Regulation

The calls for change in the regulation stalled during congressional

hearings just enough for the regulation's proponents to establish a front
and fight back against those that sought to eliminate it." 5 The day after
congressional hearings on the regulation, SEC Enforcement Director
Richard Walker criticized the rush to judgment and disparaged the
research sponsored by organizations that opposed the rule, calling it a
"survey swamp" aimed at finding "more negative effects than positive
effects" of the regulation.' 1 6 The SEC's General Counsel, David
Becker, likewise criticized the negative statements and surveys by opponents of the regulation." 7 As the public became aware of the opposition
movement, many viewed it as simply an offensive by those in the securities industry who desired to turn back the clock to the old system of
selective disclosure." 8 In the end, many criticized Unger for opening
the debate on the regulation, feeling that any discussion of repeal or
modification was grossly premature."19
115. See Jeff D. Opdyke, Rule of FairDisclosureHurts Analysts, House Subcommittee Is Told
at Hearing, WALL ST. J., May 18, 2001, at C15; Witmer, supra note 76.
116. Richard H. Walker, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Remarks Before the Rocky Mountain Securities Conference (May 18, 2001). At the
time Walker compared the "virtual stampede to declare" Regulation FD a "success or failure" to
be "much like the networks' efforts to project a winner in a presidential election even before the
polls have closed." Id. He said that "parties on all sides of the debate" were "rushing to publish
studies, surveys, and purportedly objective analysis of FD, perhaps in the belief that whoever
speaks first will gain an advantage in controlling future debate." Id.; see also SEC Strikes Back at
Reg. FD Surveys, INVESTOR RELATIONS Bus., June 11, 2001.

117. See Burns, supra note 111. Becker particularly criticized the SIA's survey as simply
"subjective impressions" by analysts concerning the rule. Id. He felt that "as a serious analysis of
the rule," the survey "fails." Id.; see also Sara Hansard, Says Reg, as Intended, Restricts Selective
Disclosure: SEC Counsel Disputes SIA 's Study on Reg FD, INVESTMENT NEWS, June 11, 2001, at
12.
118. See La Monica, supra note 88, at 80.
119. See Taking Sides - Regulation FD: Tinker with It, but Don't Toss It in the Trash,
INVESTMENT NEWS, June 4, 2001, at 10; David Moon, Regulation FD Levels Playing Fieldfor All
Investors, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, June 10, 2001, at D2; Jeff D. Opdyke & Michael
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B.

Change of Guard at SEC

Against this backdrop of a growing counter-movement against
changing the regulation, came the prospect of a changing of the guard at
the SEC. When President Bush opted to appoint Harvey Pitt, instead of
Unger, as the SEC's chair, the question remained whether Pitt would
carry forward the securities industry's calls for change in the
regulation. 120
During his nomination hearings, Pitt, who had been critical of the
rule while representing the securities industry in private practice,
acknowledged familiarity with criticisms of the regulation and said that
he felt that it was a rule that required "a closer look."' 2 ' Nevertheless,
he testified that he felt that the concept behind the rule was "unassailable,"' 22 and favored awaiting the results of the Commission's monitoring of the regulation before coming to any conclusions as to how the
regulation was working and whether anything needed to be done about
23

it. 1

C.

Studies Refuting Alleged Adverse Impacts of the Regulation

Three months after congressional hearings on the regulation, an
independent academic study on the impact of the regulation found that
the regulation had not caused harm to the marketplace.' 24 The study, by
the business schools at University of Southern California and Purdue
University, was the first formal empirical study of the impact of the
regulation, and it was not tainted by the sponsorship of any group with a
vested interest in the regulation. 2 5 Sampling more than 1,500 compaSchroeder, Disclosure Rule Gets a Bad Rap, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2001, at CI. Former Chairman
Arthur Levitt thought the whole debate over the regulation was "absolutely premature." Id.
120. See Judith Bums, Pitt Unlikely to Rescind Regulation FD, Atty Doty Says, Dow JONES
NEWS SERVICE, May 10, 2001.

121. Judith Bums, SEC Nominee Pitt Promises Look at Decimals, Regulation FD, Dow JONES
NEws SERVICE, July 19, 2001. Harvey Pitt's past representation of numerous firms in the
securities industry made individual investor groups nervous about the fate of the regulation once
Pitt was confirmed. See Adam Levy, U.S. Investors Ready to Fight to Retain FD: Individuals
Fear Loss of SEC's Disclosure Rule, NAT'L POST, Aug. 1, 2001, at D4. Such groups vowed to
vehemently protest if the SEC tried to repeal or substantially weaken the regulation. Id. John
Markese, President of the 180,000-member-strong American Association of Individual Investors,
warned that, if such actions were taken, "you'll have people with pitchforks in the streets." Id.
122. Bums, supra note 121; see also Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Nominee Says Rules Need a
Review, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2001, at Cl.
123. See Phyllis Diamond, Pitt Concurs in Staff Views on 'Good Faith' Reg FD Compliance,
SEC. Ra. & L. REp., Aug. 20, 2001, at 1206; see also Matthew Goldstein, Happy Birthday Reg
FD, Dow JONES NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 23, 2001.

124. See Regulation Does Not Harm Markets, Says USC Report, Bus. WIRE, July 23, 2001
[hereinafter Academic Study].
125. See id.
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nies, the researchers found no evidence of increased stock volatility cen1 26
tered around earnings announcements as a result of the regulation.
Likewise, the study found "no significant deterioration" in the performance of analysts' forecasts. 1 27 The only "significant effect" the research-

ers found was "almost a doubling of the number of voluntary earnings
disclosures by managers. "128 The study delivered a strong blow to criticisms by the securities industry that Regulation FD had impaired corpo29
rate disclosure and increased volatility in the marketplace.
Another significant survey with results favorable to Regulation FD
was conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers, which polled corporate issuers concerning their attitudes about the regulation.' 30 Approximately
ninety percent of the corporate leaders surveyed felt that Regulation FD
should be continued, and that the regulation had increased or provided
the same level of fairness compared to the way things were prior to the
regulation.' 3' With respect to the question of volatility, seventy-five
percent of the issuers "reported no impact on their company's stock
price" as a result of the regulation. 32 The survey was significant in that,
a year after the enactment of the regulation, the entities responsible for
compliance, corporate issuers, overwhelmingly accepted the rule and
gave it high marks with respect to its fairness goals.' 3 3 A month after
126. See id. The evidence revealed "a slight reduction in return volatility around earnings
announcements since Regulation FD." Id. The study involved a sampling of 1595 companies in
which "researchers examined the quality of information reflected in both stock prices and various
measures of analysts forecasting performance before and after implementation of Regulation FD."
Id.
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. See id.; see also Phyllis Plitch, Reg FD Study: The Regulation Has Not HarmedFlow of
Info, Dow JONES NEWS SERVICE, July 23, 2001. The study was scrutinized by the securities
industry. Frank Fernandez, the chief economist at the SEC, said that the results seem "to run
counter to what the conventional wisdom is." Phyllis Plitch, Dire Effects of Disclosure Rule
Doubted, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2001, at C14; see also Is Disclosure Rule a Non-Event? Reg. FD
Has Not led to More Volatility, Study Says, INVESTOR RELATIONS Bus., Aug. 6, 2001.
130. See Regulation FD Significantly Improves Disclosure, Pricewaterhouse Survey Finds,
Bus. WIRE, Oct. 17, 2001 [hereinafter PwC Survey]. PricewaterhouseCoopers surveyed "leaders
from 201 publicly held U.S. corporations on the impact of the first year of the regulation: 79 with
large market cap ($5 billion or more), 69 with a medium-size market cap ($1-$4.9 billion) and 53
with a small market cap (under $1 billion)." Id. Interviewed were "120 VPs/Directors of Investor
Relations, and 81 CFOs, controllers and Financial Managers." Id.
131. See id. While an overwhelming percentage of corporate leaders felt that the regulation
should be continued, "sixty-eight percent said the SEC should issue specific guidelines about what
information is 'material' to companies and requires disclosure, and what is not 'material"' Id.
Only ten percent recommended repeal of the regulation. Id.
132. See id.
133. See Judith Bums, Survey Finds SEC's FairDisclosure Rule a Plus, Dow JONES NEWS
SERVICE, Oct. 17, 2002; Neal Lipschutz, Point of View: Corp Execs Give Reg FD OK 1 Year
Later, Dow JONES NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 17, 2001. Despite the approval of the regulation by
corporate issuers, the securities industry continued to complain that the regulation had hurt them.
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the survey came out, Senator Paul Sarbanes, Chairman of the Senate
Banking Committee and co-author of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, expressed
approval of the regulation and said he was encouraged by the results of
broadening acceptance of the rule,
the survey, which he felt "indicate[d]
' 134
controversy."
initial
the
despite
D.

Corporate Scandals

Overshadowing and eventually consuming the battle over the regulation, came the implosion of Enron and other corporate scandals,
135
heightening the public's awareness and fears of corporate corruption.
Even before the scandals, Congress and the investing public had already
begun to focus on shady conflict-of-interest issues within the analyst
industry.' 36 But once the corporate scandals broke out, whatever sympa-

thy that might have existed for analysts' concerns about the regulation
was diminished, ending any chance for substantial modification or
repeal of the regulation.' 37 Instead the public's distaste for corporate
scandals and analyst conflict-of-interest issues led to wider acceptance
of the regulation. By the time Commissioner Unger finally released her
once-much-anticipated study on Regulation FD in December 2001, the
movement for reform or repeal of the regulation was dead, and her recommendations were largely ignored.' 3 8 And as calls for stricter enforceResults from a survey conducted by the AIMR of financial analysts and portfolio managers
released around the same time as the results from the PwC Survey found that a majority of those
in the securities industry still felt that the quality and quantity of substantive information had
declined as a result of the regulation. See AIMR Survey Finds Reg FD Succeeding in Fairness
Goal; Overall Disclosure Reduced, SEC. REG. & L. REP., Oct 18, 2001, at 1536 n.42; Lynn
Cowan, Disclosure Rule is Receiving Mixed Reviews, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2001, at BI ; Fair
But Not Full Disclosure; Everyone Has Less Information Under Regulation FD, Analysts,
Portfolio Managers Say in AIMR Survey; Analysts Ask for More Frequent Conference Calls,
Earnings Updates, Bus. WINE, Oct. 18, 2001; Neal Lipschutz, Point of View: Reg FD Survey
Show No Shifts in Stance, Dow JONES NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 18, 2001.
134. Rachel McTague, Sarbanes Favors Reg FD; SEC Enforcement Standards, SEC. REG. &
L. REP., Nov. 19, 2001, at 1637 n.45.
135. Stephanie Anderson Forest & Wendy Zellner, The Enron Debacle, Bus. WK., Nov. 12,
2001, at 106; Daniel Kadlec, Power Failure;As Enron Crashes, Angry Workers and Shareholders
ask Where were the Firm's Directors? The Regulators? The Stock Analysts?, TIME, Dec. 10,
2001, at 68; Daniel Kadlec, Who's Accountable?: Inside the Growing Enron Scandal: How
Evidence was Shredded and Top Executives Fishedfor a Bailout as the Company Imploded, TIME,
Jan. 21, 2002, at 28; see also Allan Sloan & Tamara Lipper, Worldcom's Wrong Numbers; A
Simple Math Trick may end up Dwarfing the Enron Scandal, and the Fallout is Only Beginning to
Spread, NEWSWEEK, July 8, 2002, at 44.
136. See Mark Hendrickson, House Hearings Dim Chances for Reg FD Changes, WALL
STREET LETTER,

Aug. 6, 2001, at 1.

137. Id.; Marcia Vickers & Mike France, How Corrupt Is Wall Street? Bus. WEEK, May 13,
2002, at 36.
138. See SEC Commissioner Laura S. Unger Releases Report, Recommends Improvements to
Regulation FD, SEC News Digest, Dec. 6, 2001; see also COMMISSIONER LAURA S. UNGER,
SPECIAL STUDY: REGULATION FAIR DISCLOSURE REVISITED (Dec. 2001). Commissioner Unger's
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ment replaced calls for change in the rule, the Commission was able to
proceed with the enforcement agenda required to provide a backbone to

the regulation.
VII.
A.

ENFORCEMENT OF REGULATION

FD

Enforcement Warnings Prior to Regulation FD Sweep

One of the biggest issues involving the regulation concerned how it
would be enforced. For a long time, the corporate community was
unsure whether the Commission would take an aggressive or lenient
stance on enforcement of the regulation, and no corporation wanted to
find out by being the first Regulation FD enforcement test case. 139
However, as corporations anxiously waited to see what enforcement
stance the Commission would take, the SEC downplayed fears of overaggressive enforcement of the regulation, reassuring the corporate community that it would not seek to punish those who sought to comply with
the regulation in good faith. In one of his first speeches following the
passage of the regulation, SEC Enforcement Director Richard Walker
stated that there was "no need for fear or hysteria" for "Regulation FD
was not designed as a trap for the unwary."' 4 0 He said the SEC was "not
going to second-guess close calls regarding the materiality" of potential
disclosures.' 4 ' Walker's position was reiterated by several other top
report came as little surprise as she advocated many of the same points and recommendations she
had previously expressed in her congressional testimony. Id. Among them, she recommended
that the SEC provide more guidance on the definition of materiality as it applied to the regulation.
Id. She also recommended that the SEC make it easier for issuers to use technology as a means
for complying with the regulation. Id. Furthermore, she recommended that the Commission
continue to study the quality of information that issuers were providing since the regulation, and,
if the regulation had caused issuers to cut back on the quality of information, consider using its
authority to encourage more disclosure. Id.; see also Floyd Norris, S.E.C. Is Urged to Refine Rule
on Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at C3; Michael Schroeder, SEC Official Says Regulation
FD Hasn't Demonstrated Clear Impact, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2001, at C12.
139. This allegedly contributed to a short-term chilling effect in the disclosure of information
as public issuers hunkered down and waited to see how the SEC would pursue potential violators
of the regulation. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying discussion on chilling effect.
140. Richard H. Walker, SEC Director, Division of Enforcement, Regulation FD: An
Enforcement Perspective, Remarks at the Compliance & Legal Division of the Securities Industry
Association, New York, N.Y. (Nov. 1, 2000) availableat www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch4I5.htm
[hereinafter Walker November 2001 Speech]. Walker said that "an issuer must have acted
recklessly or intentionally in making a selective disclosure" for there to be a violation of the
regulation. Id.
141. Id. Walker said that "[a]n issuer's incorrect determination that information is not material
must represent an 'extreme departure' from standards of reasonable care in order for [the SEC] to
allege a violation of FD." Id. The Director acknowledged the claims by some in the industry of a
chilling effect, noting that "any such effect being observed [was] largely due to an overabundance
of caution." Id. He believed such an overabundance of caution was "fed by the dire predictions
of numerous law firms and others opposed to the rule." Id. He added that the SEC Enforcement
Division would not be "second-guessing reasonable disclosure decisions made in good faith" nor
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SEC officials. 4 2 Despite his reassuring words, Walker did caution that
the Enforcement Division would not be a "toothless tiger" in enforcement of the rule.'4 3 He warned that the SEC would be on the lookout for
The first type would concern "egregious viotwo types of violations.'
lations involving the intentional or reckless disclosure of information
that is unquestionably material." 1 45 The second type would involve
those "who deliberately attempt to game the system either by speaking
was the SEC "looking to test the outer limits of the rule by bringing cases that aggressively
challenge the choices issuers are entitled to make regarding the manner in which a disclosure is
made." Id. He said there would be no "FD Swat teams" and he did not envision any "FD sweeps"
in the absence of widespread noncompliance with the regulation. Id.
142. Director Walker's position on enforcement of the regulation was soon corroborated by
other high-ranking officials at the SEC. A day after Walker's speech, David Martin, the SEC's
Director of the Division of Corporation Finance, stressed that the SEC would not be seeking to
enforce the regulation in "close cases." See Rachel Witmer, SEC's Martin Tells Law Gathering
Reg FD Enforcement Not for 'Close Cases,' SEC. REG. & L. REP., Feb. 13, 2000, at 1546, 1547
(quoting SEC Director of Corporation Finance David Martin). Martin said "[tihe enforcement
division" was "not looking for close cases" and that no one would be "splitting hairs." Id. at 1547.
Martin made the comments on November 2, 2000, during a speech at a Practicing Law Institute
conference on securities regulation in New York. Id. And at the SEC's Roundtable,
Commissioners Hunt and Unger both stressed that the SEC would not be overly aggressive in
enforcement of the rule. See Jeffrey Goldfarb, Industry ParticipantsWant SEC to Issue Guidance
on Regulation FD, SEC. REG. & L. REP., Apr. 30, 2001, at 637; see also Phyllis Plitch, SEC Eyes
Regulation FD, Will Explore Further 'Guidance,' Dow JONES NEW SERVICE, Apr. 24, 2001.
Commissioner Hunt said the SEC would be "very cautious in the way" the regulation would be
enforced. Id. He also noted his concern that there was a "feeling among companies that they have
to be overly cautious" or else the SEC "will get them." See Murray, supra note 95. Less than a
month after the Roundtable, the two commissioners, along with Commissioner Carey, reiterated
the benign enforcement stance in congressional hearings on the regulation. See supra notes 10010 and accompanying discussion. Commissioner Hunt, noting that the SEC was not necessarily
"looking for a test case," said that he would not "personally support an enforcement action in a
case that [he] did not find to be egregious." See Hunt Congressional Testimony, supra note 109.
Commissioner Carey echoed Director Walker's sentiments that the "Commission does not intend
to bring an enforcement action against an issuer who is making a good faith reasonable effort to
comply with the rule." See Carey Congressional Testimony, supra note 50. He then said he
"would be very reluctant to support an FD enforcement action based on a mere technical violation
where an issuer made a good faith, reasonable attempt at compliance." Id. Incoming SEC
Chairman Harvey Pitt, in response to questions posed at his confirmation hearing, also voiced his
concurrence with the enforcement staff's approach in not attempting to "second-guess reasonable,
good faith judgment by persons who honestly attempt to comply" with the regulation. See Phyllis
Diamond, Pitt Concurs in Staff Views on 'Good Faith' Reg FD Compliance, SEC. REG. & L. REP.,
Aug. 20, 2001, at 1206. Pitt made his statements in written responses to questions posed by
Senator Susan Collins of Maine at Pitt's confirmation hearing. Id.
143. See Walker November 2001 Speech, supra note 140.
144. See id.
145. Id. This type "includes the selective disclosure of information regarding mergers or
acquisitions, earnings, or other matters that the courts or the Commission have long held to be
material." Id. He then said that the regulation's Approval Release "spells out seven items that
should be reviewed carefully to determine whether they are material: earnings information;
mergers and acquisitions; new products or developments regarding customers and suppliers;
changes in control or management; change in auditors; a default or calling of securities; and
bankruptcies." Id.; see also supra note 27 and accompanying discussion.
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in code, or stepping over the line again and again, thus diminishing the
credibility of a claim that their disclosures were non-intentional." 14' 6
Despite attempts by SEC officials to ease the corporate commu-

nity's fears about the Commission's enforcement of the regulation, there
were signs that the SEC was growing wary of prohibited corporate conduct that was continuing after the regulation. Months after the regulation was enacted, it became apparent that the SEC had several
confidential investigations into potential violations under way.' 4 7 Then
in March 2001, the press reported on two specific SEC investigations
involving Raytheon and Motorola. 4 8 Soon thereafter, in a May 2001
speech, Enforcement Director Walker warned again that he was disturbed by continuing selective disclosure practices. 4 9 And as the corpo146. Id. Walker said information could not come in a "coded response calculated to convey
indirectly information that cannot be disclosed directly." Id. He also cautioned that the SEC
would be on the lookout for "situations involving multiple violations that an issuer claims were
non-intentional," noting that such a pattern would "surely ... raise questions as to whether these
were truly innocent slips." Id. Overall, Walker's speech was designed to provide a level of
comfort that the SEC would be reasonable in its enforcement of the regulation. Id.; see also
Walker Addresses Enforcement Issues Under New Regulation FD, SEC TODAY, vol. 2000-213,
Nov. 6, 2000; Richard Hill, SEC Enforcement Chief Tells SIA New FairDisclosureRules Target
Issuers, SEC. REG. & L. REP., Nov. 6, 2000, at 1517; Head of SEC Enforcement Division
Comments on Regulation FD, ANDREWS SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP., Dec. 6, 2000.
147. See SEC Probes Possible FairDisclosure Violations, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2001, at C5.
Stephen Cutler, then Deputy Director of the SEC's Enforcement Division, in March 2001, said
there were "about half a dozen situations" that the Division was "currently looking at" involving
potential violations of the regulation. Id.
148. Michael Schroeder, Raytheon's Disclosure to Analysts Is Investigated, WALL ST. J., Mar.
15, 2001, at A3. Raytheon and Motorola declined to comment on the probes. Id.; see also SEC
Probes Possible FairDisclosure Violations, L.A. TMESs, Mar. 16, 2001, at C5; Neil Roland, SEC
Chief to Enforce Standard; Unger Has Repeatedly Criticized Fair-DisclosureRule, WASH. POST,
Mar. 16, 2001, at E3.
149. See Richard H. Walker, Director, Division of Enforcement, Remarks Before the Rocky
Mountain Securities Conference, Denver, Colorado (May 18, 2001). In the speech, Walker
reiterated that Regulation FD was not designed as a trap for the unwary and that the enforcement
staff would only pursue "clear-cut" violations of the regulation. Id. Nevertheless, he did say he
was troubled by evidence suggesting that conduct by some issuers had not changed, even though
seven months had passed since enactment of the regulation. Id. He compared what he should be
seeing to that of an advertisement for a diet shake. Id. "Just like in the advertisements for those
amazing diet shakes, we should see a marked difference between the 'before' picture and the
'after' picture." Id. He added that "[u]nfortunately, this is not always the case." Id. Walker said
he still "read of top corporate officials calling multiple analysts to review prior announcements,
resulting in the analysts lowering their earnings estimates." Id. He also had heard of senior
officers making calls to analysts and "talking them down from their earlier assumptions." Id. He
said he had learned of "senior officials who, late in the quarter, confirm to a single analyst
guidance given publicly months earlier when market conditions were very different." Id. These
kinds of stories, he said, would "almost certainly trigger an enforcement inquiry." Id. He also
said the Enforcement Division was "currently looking at fewer than ten situations involving
potential FD violations." Id. Walker stressed that "[t]wo constituencies that strongly supported
adoption of Regulation FD - individual investors and the press - have emerged as energetic
watchdogs for potential violations of the rule." Id. For more on Walker's May 2001 speech, see
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rate community braced for the outcome of the SEC's probes of
Raytheon and Motorola, and possibly others, one thing was certain
150
enforcement action by the SEC was imminent.
B.

Regulation FD Sweep

On November 25, 2002, the SEC brought four actions for violations of Regulation FD. These actions, part of a sweep, made a strong
statement to the public that Regulation FD would be enforced and that
violations would not be tolerated. 15
1.

IN THE MATTER OF RAYTHEON COMPANY AND FRANKLYN A. CAINE

As expected, given press reports of the underlying investigation,
the SEC instituted and settled administrative cease and desist proceedings against Raytheon and its Chief Financial Officer, Franklyn A.
Caine."5 2 The action involved violations of the regulation by Raytheon,
Walker Outlines Enforcement Effort as SEC Watchesfor Reg FD Violators, SEC. REG. & L. REP.,
June 4, 2001, at 826. It is important to note that two weeks after Walker's words of caution, SEC
General Counsel David Becker promised that the SEC would bring cases against companies that it
believes violated the rule. See Bums, supra note 111. Becker promised the SEC "will bring
cases" against companies violating the regulation. Id.
150. See Motorola's Talks with Analysts Examined, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2001, at C12; John
Labate, SEC Launches Probesinto Disclosure Violations: U.S. Regulators Still Seek FirstReg FD
Transgression, NAT'L POST, Apr. 8, 2002, at FD3; Phyllis Plitch, Motorola Says Private
Discussions with Analysts Aren't Material, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2001, at B2. Some reports
suggested that the prospect of an enforcement action became even more likely when the SEC
began to come under fire amid the corporate scandals involving Enron and WorldCom. See Anne
Marie Squeo, Raytheon May Settle with SEC in Disclosure Case, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2002, at
B9.
151. The SEC did not formally label the actions a "sweep," a term commonly used by the
Enforcement Division for a large number of simultaneously filed enforcement actions related to
similar violations, but the actions could be seen as a sweep since they were brought at the same
time, involved alleged violations of the same regulation, and sent a strong message. This is
particularly true in light of the fact that there were no Regulation FD cases prior to the sweep. See
Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Charges 41 People in 13 Actions
Involving More Than $25 Million in Microcap Fraud (Sept. 24, 1998), available at www.sec.gov/
news/press/pressarchive/1998/98-92.txt;
Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, SEC Charges 44 Stock Promoters in First Internet Securities Fraud Sweep (Oct. 28,
1998); Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Charges 82 Individuals
and Companies in 26 Actions Involving More Than $12 Million in Second Nationwide Microcap
Fraud Sweep (Aug. 3, 1999); Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC
Charges 68 Individuals and Entities with Fraud and/or Abuses of the Financial Reporting Process
(Sept. 28, 1999); Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC, State Securities
Regulators Announce Promissory Note Enforcement Sweep (June 1, 2000); and Press Release,
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Charges 23 Companies and Individuals in Cases
Involving Broad Spectrum of Internet Securities Fraud (Mar. 1, 2001).
152. In the Matter of Raytheon Company and Franklyn A. Caine, Exchange Act Release No.
46897 (Nov. 25, 2002). In anticipation of the public cease-and desist proceedings, Raytheon and
the CFO each submitted an offer of settlement, which the Commission accepted. Id. Without
admitting or denying the findings set forth within, Raytheon and the CFO consented to the entry
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through its CFO, after the CFO selectively provided earnings guidance
to sell-side equity analysts covering the company. 153 After a February 7,
2001, investor conference call, in which Raytheon reiterated annual
earnings-per-share guidance but did not provide quarterly earnings-pershare guidance, the CFO directed his staff to contact sell-side analysts
covering the company and request copies of the analysts' quarterly models for the company.' 5 4 The CFO then arranged and conducted one-onone calls with the analysts, generally communicating that their first
quarter earnings-per-share estimates were too high, and specifically
informing some of them that their estimates were either "too high,"
"aggressive," or "very aggressive." '55 As a result of the calls, the analysts subsequently revised their earnings estimates for the first quarter,
the consensus of which Raytheon subsequently beat by a penny per
1 56
share when it reported its actual first quarter earnings.
In bringing the action, the Commission stressed that the CFO selectively disclosed earnings guidance, the "prototypical disclosures Regulation FD aimed to prohibit."' 5 7 The Commission stated that "one of the
primary purposes of Regulation FD was to prohibit the issuer practice of
selectively providing guidance to securities analysts regarding earnings
forecasts," 1 58 and found that the company's disclosures to analysts were
material because, among other things, the subject matter of the informaof the Order Instituting Public Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Making Findings, and Imposing a
Cease-and-Desist Order Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. The CFO directed his staff to contact each sell-side analyst whose estimates were
included in Thomson Corporation's First Call Service. Id.
155. Id. From mid-February to early March, the CFO had one-on-one calls with eleven of
thirteen sell-side analysts who were covering Raytheon stock and "whose estimates were part of
the consensus estimate maintained by First Call." Id. Raytheon had yet to provide public
quarterly earnings guidance for 2001, and the CFO knew that the analysts' first quarter 2001 EPS
estimates exceeded Raytheon's own internal estimate, and "that the analysts' 2001 quarterly
earnings estimates reflected a less seasonal quarterly distribution than 2000 results." Id. During
the one-on-one calls, the CFO told the analysts that Raytheon's earnings for 2001 would likely
have the same seasonal distribution as in 2000, and that "Raytheon would generate one-third of its
EPS in the first half of the year and remaining two-thirds in the second half of the year." Id.
156. See id. By mid March 2001, after the CFO's calls, the 2001 first quarter earnings per
share consensus had dropped from thirty-one cents to twenty-seven cents per share, a penny below
Raytheon's internal forecast. Id. The Street's first quarter earnings per share consensus of
twenty-seven cents stayed the same until Raytheon reported first quarter earnings per share of
twenty-eight cents in April 2001. Id. In a public conference call moderated by the CFO
discussing Raytheon's first quarter results, the company stated that it was "pleased to report
another quarter of progress toward our goal of restoring your confidence in our company" and that
the quarter represented "the fifth straight quarter we have met or exceeded our commitments to
you."' Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. The order then cited the portion of the Approval Release that warned that providing
direct or indirect guidance could result in violation of the regulation. Id.; see also supra notes 2829 and accompanying discussion.
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tion related to earnings guidance. 59 As the selective disclosures were
made intentionally within the meaning of the regulation, Raytheon was
required to make simultaneous public disclosure of the relevant60 information, which it had failed to do, thus violating the regulation.1
The order mandated that Raytheon and the CFO cease and desist
from committing or causing any violations of the securities laws that
they were found to have violated.' 6 1 There were no further sanctions
Campos dissented
besides the cease-and-desist remedy. Commissioner
162
penalty.
a
of
lack
the
of
because
order
the
from
SIGNIFICANCE OF CASE

The Commission clearly signaled that it would not tolerate the
practice of issuers selectively disclosing earnings guidance to analysts.
In noting that this was the "prototypical" type of disclosure that the regulation had aimed to prohibit, the SEC stressed that such earnings guidance, when selectively disseminated, would clearly run afoul of the
regulation. 63 Thus, the case provided the Commission an opportunity
to reiterate the intent of the regulation: to prohibit issuers from selectively disclosing earnings guidance to analysts.' 64
A disturbing revelation in Raytheon was that the CFO of a New
York Stock Exchange listed company conducted one-on-one calls and
provided the very type of earnings guidance to analysts that the regulation was designed to prohibit. His conduct was in blatant disregard of
the regulation and was, in my view, probably the most heinous among
the four sweep cases brought by the Commission. Given this extreme
departure from compliance with the regulation, one has to ask why a
civil penalty was not sought. Commissioner Campos's dissent shows
159. See id. The Commission found Raytheon's disclosures to analysts to be material "by
reason of (1) the subject matter of the information, i.e., earnings guidance," (2) the CFO's conduct
in "reaching out to each analyst to deliver the same message, (3) the consistent reaction of the
analysts to lower their first quarter estimates after receiving Raytheon's guidance, (4) the decision
of two analysts to announce the lowering of their first quarter estimates in calls to their firms'
sales forces, and (5) the e-mails sent by one firm's sale's force following an analyst call discussing
the firm's reduced estimate." Id. The Commission determined that "[b]ecause these factors
establish materiality," it did not have to reach the issue of "whether the trading and price decline
in Raytheon stock on March 1, 2001 was attributable to Raytheon's earnings disclosures." Id.
The Commission added that such disclosures revealed nonpublic information. Id.
160. See id. The selective disclosure was made intentionally within the meaning of 243.101(a)
of Regulation FD. Id. As a result of the violations, Raytheon violated § 13(a) of the Exchange
Act and Regulation FD, and the CFO was a cause of Raytheon's violations of § 13(a) of the
Exchange Act and Regulation FD. Id.

161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
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that there was disagreement within the Commission on this issue. Campos' dissent, along with the Commission's careful wording of the order,
should alert the marketplace to two important lessons to be taken from
the case. First, selective disclosure of earnings guidance to analysts will
clearly run afoul of Regulation FD. Second, issuers should be concerned about potentially stiffer sanctions than those sought in Raytheon
165
for any such blatant violations in the future.
2.

IN THE MATTER OF SECURE COMPUTING CORPORATION
AND JOHN MCNULTY

In 2002, the SEC instituted and settled administrative cease and
desist proceedings against Secure Computing Corporation and its CEO,
John McNulty. 166 The SEC alleged that the CEO had disclosed a significant contract to two institutional investors without disclosing that information simultaneously to the public. 167 Specifically, in early 2002,
Secure Computing, a software company specializing in Internet securityrelated products, entered into an important equipment manufacturing
agreement with a major buyer.168 Later, during a March 6, 2002, conference call with a portfolio manager at an investment advisory firm, the
CEO, after broadly consulting with Secure Computing's Director of
Investor Relations ("IR Director"), disclosed the agreement to the portfolio manager.16 The IR Director, unaware that the CEO was going to
talk about the agreement, realized when the CEO began disclosing the
agreement during the conference call that the information had never
been publicly announced and that the CEO should not be discussing
it. 70 Nevertheless, the IR Director did not interrupt the CEO during the
conference call, but instead left the CEO a voicemail later, informing
him that he had disclosed nonpublic information.' 7 ' Later that day, but
before listening to the IR Director's voicemail, the CEO responded to an
165. Indeed, the Commission's action in Schering-Ploughevidences this. See infra notes 25070 and accompanying discussion.
166. In the Matter of Secure Computing Corporation and John McNulty, Exchange Act
Release No. 46895 (Nov. 25, 2002). In anticipation of the public cease-and desist proceedings,
Secure Computing and McNulty each submitted an offer of settlement, which the Commission
accepted. Id. Without admitting or denying the findings set forth within, Secure Computing and
the CEO consented to the entry of the Order Instituting Public Cease-and-Desist Proceedings,
Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order Pursuant to Section 21C of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
167. See id.
168. See id. Neither Secure Computing nor the buyer made any public announcement of the
agreement. Id. The agreement itself required the buyer's consent before Secure Computing could
announce the deal. Id.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
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e-mail message from a managing partner of a brokerage
firm, and indi72
rectly confirmed that there had indeed been a deal.
The following day, March 7, 2002, after the company received
numerous calls from various investors and analysts concerning rumors
that were circulating about the agreement, the company's management
wanted to issue a press release about the agreement, but the buyer would
not agree to it. 173 Nevertheless, the CEO, while conducting conference
calls with four additional institutional investors, disclosed during a
fourth call with a portfolio manager that Secure Computing had entered
into an agreement with the buyer. 174 This disclosure took place at 10:15
a.m. PST. 175 At 1:40 p.m. PST, Secure Computing issued a press
76
release announcing the agreement.'
The Commission found that the information the company and CEO
had selectively disclosed on March 6 and 7 was material and nonpublic. 1 77 The Commission also determined that the March 6 selective disclosure was non-intentional, requiring Secure Computing to make
prompt public disclosure of the information concerning the agreement,
but that the March 7 selective disclosure was intentional, requiring
Secure Computing to make simultaneous public disclosure of the agreement.' 78 The company's failure to simultaneously publicly disclose the
agreement when it made its intentional disclosure to the portfolio manager resulted in the violation.' 79 As in the case of Raytheon, Commissioner Campos again dissented from the order because of the lack of any
80
civil penalty.
SIGNIFICANCE OF CASE

Secure Computing is a great case for providing guidance on when
prompt versus simultaneous public disclosure is required in matters
involving non-intentional versus intentional selective disclosure. Where
the company, through its CEO, on March 6 mistakenly selectively dis172. See id. "Shortly after sending the e-mail response," the CEO retrieved the IR Director's
voicemail message and then called the "managing partner of the brokerage firm and requested that
the information be kept confidential." Id. Secure Computing made no general public
announcement of the agreement on March 6, 2002. Id.
173. See id.
174. See id. The CEO "further explained that the deal had not yet been publicized ... but that
he anticipated an announcement shortly." Id.
175. See id.
176. See id.

177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id. As a result, Secure Computing violated § 13(a) of the Exchange Act and
Regulation FD, and the CEO was a cause of Secure Computing's violations of § 13(a) of the
Exchange Act and Regulation FD. Id.

180. See id.
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closed information, the Commission found such selective disclosures to
constitute non-intentional disclosures, thus requiring prompt, instead of
simultaneous, disclosure. The Commission did not cite the company as
violating the prompt public disclosure requirement. In my view, this
suggests that the company's public disclosure on March 7 occurred "as
soon as reasonably practicable (but in no event after the later of 24 hours
or the commencement of the next day's trading on the New York Stock
Exchange) after a senior official of the issuer" learned of the non-inten8
tional disclosures.' '
Secure Computing is also significant in that it endorses the mechanisms within the regulation that allow some room for mistakes. Where
the March 6 selective disclosures were made non-intentionally, as the
result of a miscommunication between the CEO and the IR Director, the
Commission did not charge the CEO for violations with respect to those
selective disclosures. It was not until the March 7 selective disclosure,
which took place after the CEO was on notice by the IR Director that his
previous disclosures had been selectively disclosed nonpublic information, that the selective disclosure was considered intentional and therefore a violation of the regulation as a result of the lack of simultaneous
disclosure to the marketplace. In my opinion, the case did not rest on
the March 6 non-intentional disclosures, but rather on the March 7 intentional disclosure. Therefore, the case stands for the proposition that
many SEC officials have expressed: that the regulation will not be a trap
for the unwary, and that good faith mistakes under the regulation will
not be punished.' 8 2
Secure Computing also was significant in that it dealt with the definition of "simultaneous disclosure." While the meaning of the phrase
seems obvious, the Commission, through the case, indicated that it
would be followed strictly. The company's March 7 public disclosure at
1:40 p.m., approximately three and a half hours after the CEO's intentional selective disclosure at 10:15 a.m., was not sufficient to meet the
simultaneous disclosure requirement. Therefore, public disclosure of
information made only hours after the intentional selective disclosure
will not meet the regulation's simultaneous disclosure requirement. This
leads one to conclude that the Commission will strictly enforce the
181. See Regulation FD, supra note 2, at 100(d). The order does not cite the specific times that
the March 6 non-intentional disclosure occurred and when the CEO was notified of it. See Secure
Computing, supra note 166. If the March 6 non-intentional selective disclosure had occurred
early in the morning, then the March 7 public disclosure probably would have been made too late,
as it would have been "after the later of 24 hours or the commencement of the next day's trading
on the New York Stock Exchange." The March 7 public disclosure was not made until after the
close of that day's trading. See id.
182. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying discussion.
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simultaneous disclosure requirement, requiring instantaneous public disclosure once an intentional disclosure has been made. So is there a

safety zone in which a public disclosure can be made following an intentional disclosure? What about public disclosures made an hour, thirty
minutes, or even five minutes after an intentional disclosure? Or one
that is made as fast as it humanly takes to draft a press release following
an intentional selective disclosure? Only future cases brought by the
Commission will answer that. For now, it has to be assumed that any
delay in public disclosure following an intentional selective disclosure
will not absolve a company.
Another important issue in the case, as in Raytheon, involves Com-

missioner Campos's dissent. Again, Commissioner Campos dissented
because of the lack of a penalty. 18 3 This signals a belief that companies
and their senior officials should be sanctioned severely for violations of
the regulation. While Campos appears to be the minority on this issue in
the sweep cases, his dissent serves as notice that the Commission may
be willing to slap companies with a lot more than just minor cease-and84
desist sanctions in future Regulation FD cases.

3.

IN THE MATTER OF SIEBEL SYSTEMS, INC., AND
SEC V. SIEBEL SYSTEMS, INC.

In the sweep case involving the heaviest sanctions, the SEC instituted and settled administrative cease and desist proceedings against
Siebel Systems, Inc., 1 8 5 and also filed a civil action against the company
in federal district court.' 86 In the civil action, Siebel consented, without

admitting or denying the Commission's allegations, to pay a two-hun183. See id.
184. Another important element of the Commission's order against Secure Computing, one
that will receive greater attention in Siebel, dealt with the Commission's tendency to look at a
company's stock price, and the effect of selective disclosures on the stock price and volume, as
having some bearing on the materiality and violative nature of the selective disclosure. See id.
The Commission noted in the order that Secure Computing's stock had increased eight percent on
March 6 on volume that was more than double of that of the day before. Id. The Commission
also noted that the company's stock price had increased seven percent on March 7 on volume that
was 130 percent higher than that of the day before. Id.
185. In the Matter of Siebel Systems, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 46896 (Nov. 25, 2002).
In anticipation of public cease-and-desist proceedings, Siebel submitted an offer of settlement,
which the Commission accepted. Id. Without admitting or denying the findings set forth within,
Siebel consented to the entry of the Order Instituting Public Cease-and-Desist Proceedings,
Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order Pursuant to Section 21C of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
186. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Siebel Systems, Inc., Litigation Release No.
17860 (Nov. 25, 2002); see also SEC Files Settled Cease-and-Desist Order Against Siebel
Systems, Inc. Finding that it Violated Regulation FD; Siebel Systems, Inc. Also Agrees to Pay a
$250,000 Civil Penalty, SEC Litigation Release No. 17860 (Nov. 25, 2002). The civil action was
filed against Siebel in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Id.
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dred-fifty-thousand dollar civil penalty.187
Siebel involved a violation of the regulation when the CEO of the
company selectively disclosed material nonpublic information about the

company at an invitation-only technology conference. 8 8 During the
November 2001 conference, hosted by Goldman Sachs & Co., the CEO
disclosed material nonpublic information."8 9 In response to questions
from the Goldman Sachs analyst who organized the conference, the
CEO disclosed that his company was optimistic because "its business
was returning to normal." 19 0 These statements by the CEO contrasted
with negative statements he had made only three weeks earlier, when he
had characterized the market for information technology as "tough," and
indicated that his company "expected business to remain that way for
the rest of the year."' 9' While analyst conferences attended by Siebel's9 2
management were normally broadcast to the public, this one was not.
Prior to the conference, the company's IR Director knew that the conference would not be simultaneously broadcast to the public, but he failed
to tell the CEO. 193 The CEO's disclosures affected the company's stock
price and trading volume, with the stock price closing up approximately
twenty percent on the day of the conference.' 94
The Commission found that the company had violated the regulation when it failed to simultaneously disclose to the public the material
nonpublic information that its CEO had disclosed to those attending the
187. See In the Matter of Siebel Systems, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 46896 (Nov. 25,
2002).
188. See id. There were 200 attendees at the invitation-only conference, including brokerdealers, investment advisers, investment companies and institutional shareholders of the
company's stock. Id. Among the attendees was the largest institutional shareholder of Siebel
stock. Id.
189. Id. The format of the conference was an informal question and answer session or
"fireside chat" in which the CEO responded to questions from the Goldman Sachs analyst who
organized the conference as well as from the audience. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. On October 17, 2002, the company had reported disappointing third quarter 2001
results, which fell short of analysts' earnings estimates. Id. At the time, the CEO said the
business environment for information technology had "been tough" and that he thought the
environment would "continue to be quite tough in the short term." Id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id. At 10 a.m., when the CEO began speaking at the conference, Siebel's stock was
trading at $18.98 per share. Id. The CEO made his relevant remarks in the first ten minutes of his
presentation, and by the end of his remarks, Siebel's stock had increased to $19.81 per share. Id.
Trading volume during his presentation was high, with more than 4.6 million shares trading hands.
Id. Following the disclosures, the stock price continued to rise, and by 1 p.m., when reports of the
CEO's comments began to surface in the media, the stock went as high as $20.15 per share
(approximately 16.5% higher than the previous day's close). Id. Trading volume for the day
exceeded 33 million shares, about double the normal trading volume. Id. Goldman Sachs was the
most active firm trading Siebel stock that day. Id.

2004]

CORPORATE ISSUERS BEWARE

technology conference. 195 The "company knew going into the conference that it would be attended by persons outside the issuer covered
under Regulation FD, including holders of its securities, 'under circumstances in which it [was] reasonably foreseeable' that such persons
'would purchase or sell the [company's] securities on the basis of the
information' provided at the conference." 1 96 The Commission determined the information disclosed by the CEO to be material and nonpublic as it encompassed internal trends in Siebel's business, and because "a
reasonable investor would have considered this information important in
'
making an investment decision regarding the company's stock."197
The
Commission found it especially important, in its analysis regarding
materiality, that the information "significantly altered the total mix of
available information" as the information "sharply contrasted" with
statements made by the CEO less than a month earlier.1 98 The Commission further looked at the impact of the information disclosed, and noted
that immediately following the CEO's disclosures, conference attendees
purchased Siebel stock or communicated the nonpublic information to
others who then traded in the stock. 199
The Commission found the company's selective disclosure,
through the CEO, to be an intentional disclosure, noting that "a disclosure is intentional when the person making the disclosure knows or is
reckless in not knowing that the information he is disclosing is both
material and nonpublic." 2" The Commission found that the CEO knew
that the information he was disclosing was material and nonpublic at the
time he was disclosing it. 2 ' And even though the CEO did not know
that he was disclosing such information selectively, the Commission
determined that the company knew or was reckless in not knowing that
such information was going to be disclosed selectively, as the IR Director knew that the conference was not going to be public and failed to
provide this information to the CEO before the CEO made his statements.2" 2 Therefore, the Commission attributed the IR Director's
knowledge of the selective disclosure, in conjunction with the CEO's
knowledge that he was disclosing material nonpublic information, in
195. See id. Specifically, the Commission found that the CEO's disclosures were made to
covered persons under the regulation. Id.
196. Id. (quoting Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 100(b)(1)(iv)). The company knew the
conference attendees included broker-dealers, investment advisers, investment companies, and
institutional shareholders. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. Id.
201. See id.
202. See id.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:751

finding that the company made an intentional disclosure because it knew
or was reckless in not knowing that it was selectively disclosing material
nonpublic information." 3
Along with the administrative action, the Commission also filed a
civil action against Siebel in federal court. 2" Siebel consented to a twohundred-fifty-thousand dollar civil penalty. 0 5 This action is the only
one of the four sweep cases that involved a federal civil court action and
a civil monetary penalty.20 6 Interestingly, in sharp contrast to Campos's
dissent in the other cases, Commissioners Cynthia Glassman and Paul
Atkins dissented here to the imposition of a penalty in the civil action.20 7
SIGNIFICANCE OF CASE

The most significant aspect of Siebel compared to the other Regulation FD sweep cases is the fact that a civil action and penalty of twohundred-fifty-thousand dollar was brought against the company. This is
somewhat surprising given that the conduct in Siebel does not appear to
be as heinous as that in Raytheon. Siebel did not involve blatant intentional selective disclosures in clear disregard of the regulation. In fact,
the CEO was not even charged in this case, as the CFO and CEO,
respectively, had been charged in Raytheon and Secure Computing.
Therefore, one has to wonder why Siebel was charged with a two-hundred-fifty-thousand dollar civil penalty, while the other defendant corporations in the sweep cases were not subject to any monetary penalty.
There was deep disagreement within the Commission over how to punish those who run afoul of the regulation. Commissioners Glassman and
Atkins, in their dissents in Siebel, objected to the imposition of a civil
penalty against Siebel, while Commissioner Campos objected, in his dissents in Raytheon and Secure Computing, to the lack of a civil penalty
against those companies. The order in Siebel does not reveal the reason
for the civil penalty; nevertheless, the case is significant it that it is the
first to signal that the Commission is willing to seek civil penalties in
Regulation FD cases, and that violations of the regulation will not be
limited to only administrative cease-and-desist remedies.
Siebel also demonstrates how liability can attach to a company as a
result of a combination of actions of its senior officials, without liability
necessarily being attributed to any one individual senior official. Where
203. See id. As a result, Siebel violated § 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Regulation FD. Id.
204. See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Siebel Systems, Inc., Litigation Release No.
17860 (Nov. 25, 2002).
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id.
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liability in Raytheon was against the company through its CFO, and in
Secure Computing against the company through its CEO, in Siebel, the
CEO did not independently cause his company to violate the regulation.
Instead, it was the actions of several people, most notably the IR Director in conjunction with the CEO, which led to the company's liability.2 °8
It was the IR Director's actions, in knowingly allowing the CEO to
selectively disclose material nonpublic information to covered persons,
in conjunction with the CEO's actions in disclosing such material nonpublic information, that led to the violation. Therefore, Siebel is significant in that it reveals that the Commission will not necessarily look at
the conduct of any one senior official within a company in assessing
whether or not a violation has occurred. Rather, the Commission may
look at a mosaic of individuals within a company and their intertwining
actions and knowledge, when assessing whether a company knew or was
reckless in not knowing whether it made a wrongful selective disclosure.
This will be the case even when the individual who made the prohibited
selective disclosure was not aware that he or she was doing so at the
time, because of a miscommunication or otherwise. 0 9
Another significant aspect of Siebel was the Commission's focus
on the reaction of the marketplace to selectively disclosed information as
a factor in its analysis of whether there was a violation of the regulation.
The Commission looked at the reactions of the conference attendees in
purchasing stock immediately after information had been selectively disclosed as evidence that the CEO had communicated new, and thus material, information concerning the company's business.2"
The
Commission also explicitly noted the impact of the disclosures on the
company's stock price (twenty-percent increase) and trading volume
(more than double) as factors evidencing disclosures of material nonpublic information that had been made selectively in violation of the
208. See id.
209. See id. The Siebel order does not suggest that the CEO realized that he was making a
selective disclosure at the time he did so, which, in my view, is the most likely reason he was not
charged. Id. Yet his actions, in conjunction with the IR Director's knowledge and lack of
communication, were attributed to the company. Id. Arguably, one has to wonder whether the IR
Director should have been charged. The Commission made clear in the order instituting
proceedings that the definition of "senior official" in the regulation includes "investor relations or

public relations officer." See id. at n.8 (citing Rule 101(f)). The IR Director, however, never
disclosed the material nonpublic information. Id. Therefore, as the IR Director's knowledge
could not be attributed to the CEO when the CEO made his disclosure of material nonpublic
information, arguably the CEO's disclosure of material nonpublic information could not be
attributed to the IR Director, who, while knowing such information would be disclosed
selectively, had not made the selective disclosure herself. Id. Instead the company was charged.
Id.
210. See id.
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regulation.2 1 1 While these factors were not, in and of themselves, key
elements in determining whether a violation had occurred, they were

considered in the overall decision to bring the action, and they shed
some light on the Commission's thought processes in what it considers

material and what it looks for in pursuing violations of the regulation.
4.

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF MOTOROLA, INC.

In a rare move, rather than bringing a federal enforcement proceeding, the SEC issued a 21(a) Report of Investigation against Motorola,
Inc. ("21(a) Report").2 1 2 According to the 21(a) Report, the SEC's Divi-

sion of Enforcement conducted an investigation into whether Motorola
Inc. violated the regulation when one of its senior officials "selectively
disclosed information about the company's quarterly sales and orders
during private telephone calls with sell-side analysts in March 2001. " '213
In the phone calls, Motorola's IR Director disclosed to analysts that first
quarter sales and orders for the company were down by at least twentyfive percent. 2 4 This sharply contrasted with an earlier press release and
conference call by the company on February 23, 2001, which stated that
Motorola's sales and orders were experiencing "significant weakness,"
that the company was likely to miss earnings estimates of twelve cents
per share for the quarter, and that it would "have an operating loss for
the quarter if the order pattern continued."2 5 After the IR Director had
211. See id.
212. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934: Motorola, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 46898 (Nov. 25, 2002). Section 21(a) of the
Exchange Act basically authorizes the SEC to investigate securities law violations and, in its
discretion, "publish information concerning any such violations." Id. The 21(a) Report did not
constitute an adjudication of any fact or issue addressed in it, and Motorola consented to the
issuance of the Report without admitting or denying any of the statements or conclusions in it. Id.
Such 21(a) Reports of Investigation have been issued only three other times in the past seven
years. See Report Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Regarding the
NASD and the NASDAQ Market (Aug. 8, 1996); Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section
21 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Concerning the Conduct of Certain Former Officers
and Directors of W.R. Grace & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 39,157 (Sept. 30, 1997); Report of
Investigation Pursuant to Section 21 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission
Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act
Release No. 44,969 (Oct. 23, 2001).
213. See Motorola, supra note 212.
214. See id.
215. Id. During a January 11, 2001, analyst conference call, which had been webcast to the
public, Motorola discussed its fourth quarter results, and estimated first quarter 2001 sales at $8.8
billion and earnings at 12 cents per share. Id. On February 23, 2001, Motorola issued a press
release stating that "as a result of significant weakness in first quarter" business, the company did
not expect to achieve the $8.8 billion in sales guidance or earnings guidance of 12 cents per share.
Id. After the press release, the company's President and CEO, in an analyst conference call
webcast to the public, again confirmed that the company was "experiencing significant weakness"
in its business as compared with its "expectations at the beginning of the quarter." Id.
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seen analysts' models and concluded that the analysts had not understood from the February 23 conference call just how disappointing the
company's quarterly results were going to be, the company decided to
telephone the analysts and explain that the word "significant," as used in
its February 23 press release and conference call, meant a twenty-five
percent "or more" decline.21 6
The Commission found that Motorola selectively disclosed material
nonpublic information when the IR Director made the private phone
calls to analysts clarifying the company's previous use of the term "significant" and informing them that the company's sales and orders were
off by twenty-five percent or more for the first quarter of 2001.217 The
Commission stated that "[w]hen an issuer endeavors to make public disclosure of material information - but later learns that it did not, in fact,
fully communicate the intended message, and determines that further
disclosure is needed - the proper course of action under Regulation FD
is not to selectively disclose the corrected message in private communications with industry professionals, but rather to make additional public
disclosure."2 8 Because, unlike in the other sweep cases, Motorola officials had in good faith sought the advice of in-house legal counsel before
engaging in the conduct at issue, and counsel had approved the conduct
in question based on an erroneous interpretation that the information was
not material or nonpublic, the Commission decided to bring a 21(a)
Report rather than an administrative or civil proceeding against the
company.2 19
An important aspect of the 21(a) Report in Motorola is that the
Commission stressed five distinct observations, all intended as guidelines for those seeking to comply with the regulation. The first observation was that the information selectively disclosed by the company was
216. Id. Motorola decided not to issue a press release or make any kind of public disclosure of
the additional information. Id. After reviewing the analysts' models and concluding that they
were overstating the company's likely quarterly results, between March 6 and 12, 2001, the IR
Director contacted approximately fifteen analysts to discuss their models and reiterate statements
made in the February 23, 2001, press release and conference call. Id. In at least ten of these calls,
the IR Director informed analysts that when Motorola used the term "significant," it meant a rate
of change of twenty-five percent or more. Id.
217. See id.
218. Id. (emphasis by the Commission).
219. See id. The IR Director "sought and obtained the advice of Motorola's in-house legal
counsel responsible for SEC reporting and disclosure issues." Id. Counsel had advised the IR
Director that he could contact selected analyst, reiterate information that had been disclosed on
February 23, as well as provide quantitative definitions for certain qualitative terms that had been
used in the February 23 announcements. Id. Counsel based the legal advice on the conclusion
that providing a quantitative definition for the term "significant" was not material. Id. Counsel
also concluded that Motorola's specific definition of the word "significant" was public for
regulation purposes. Id.
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clearly material.2 2 ° The Commission, noting its previous statements that
it would not second-guess close calls on materiality, stressed that the
information conveyed by the IR Director to analysts was clearly material
as there was a substantial likelihood that reasonable investors would
consider it important that the company's business was down by twentyfive percent or more for the quarter. 221 The second guideline stressed by
the Commission was that senior officials need to be "particularity cautious" during private conversations with analysts.2 22 A third observation, which is particular to the facts underlying Motorola, is that "afterthe-fact private communications of material, nonpublic information to
securities professionals" is "not a proper way to supplement a prior public disclosure that the issuer determines to have been misunderstood or
misinterpreted. ' 223 The Commission stated that "[i]f an issuer becomes
aware ... that information it is trying to convey to the public has not in
fact been conveyed, and the issuer determines that further disclosure is
necessary, the proper course of action under Regulation FD is to make
additional public disclosure. '224 A fourth observation by the Commission dealt with the use of "code" words.22 5 The Commission said that
"[w]hen communicating with securities industry professionals, issuers
may not use 'code' words to selectively disclose information that they
could not selectively disclose" otherwise.2 2 6 In Motorola, the Commission was troubled by the company's use of the term "significant" when
the company later engaged in private discussions with analysts and provided "a more detailed quantitative definition of the code word

'significant.'

",227

220. See id.
221. See id. The Commission found this to be the case, even though the company had
previously stated that its business was experiencing "significant weakness." Id. The IR Director
had communicated material nonpublic information by providing a quantitative definition for the
term "significant." Id.
222. See id. The Commission noted that the regulation does not prohibit private discussions
with analysts. Id. However it stressed that the regulation prohibits the disclosure of material
nonpublic information during those discussions. Id. Therefore senior officials need to be
especially careful about what is discussed and said, during such conversations, as any disclosure
of material nonpublic information, intentionally or accidentally, may cause the company to run
afoul of the regulation. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. Therefore, there can be no clarifications of previous public statements when such
clarifications are made selectively. Id. Yet if such clarifications are made publicly, then there
should be no problem. Id. In Motorola's case, it sought to selectively clarify its use of the term
"significant" as conveyed in a previous press release and conference call. Id.
225. See id.
226. Id. As the Commission has stated previously, issuers cannot selectively disclose
indirectly what they are prohibited from doing directly. Id. The use of "code" words or "winks or
nods" as a means of conveying material nonpublic information will be considered the same as a
direct explicit disclosure of such material nonpublic information. Id.
227. Id.
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The fifth and most important guidance by the Commission in the
21(a) Report was that, in issuing the 21(a) Report rather than a formal
enforcement action, the Commission was "crediting Motorola's reliance
on counsel in the context of this case concerning Regulation FD"
because the Commission understood "that legal advice was sought and
given in good faith. ' 122 The Commission stressed that it encouraged
"honest, carefully considered attempts to comply with Regulation FD"
and felt that, in Motorola's case, it appeared that the company had acted
"based on advice of counsel, that although erroneous, was sought and
given in good faith."2'2 9 However, while advice of counsel was a mitigating factor concerning the type of remedy sought, the Commission
stressed that reliance on counsel would "not necessarily provide a successful defense in all future cases. 23 ° It added that "[t]he availability of
any reliance on counsel argument" would turn on "all the facts and circumstances" of a case, and in cases "where relevant facts are concealed
from counsel" or "where counsel's advice was not faithfully given and
followed," there would not be "a valid reliance on counsel argument." 2 3 '
SIGNIFICANCE OF CASE

This case is significant because of the reliance on counsel mitigation defense, which allowed the company to receive a 21(a) Report
rather than other sanctions. The Commission publicly stated that Motorola had run afoul of the regulation, but that the Commission had determined not to bring an actual enforcement action against the company
because of its good faith reliance on counsel. The reliance on counsel
argument seemed to be a strong one within the Commission, as this case
was the only one of the four sweep cases that did not involve any dissension among the commissioners.2 32 So should one glean Motorola to
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. The Commission stated that in situations where "in some cases counsel's advice may
provide the officer with a good faith basis for making the disclosure at the time the advice is
received, but the officer later learns of additional information that puts him or her on notice that
the information being disclosed is material and nonpublic," then such disclosure will constitute a
clear violation of the regulation, notwithstanding counsel's prior advice. Id. For example, after
making a selective disclosure that he or she believes in good faith is not material, an officer may
become aware of a very significant market reaction and may learn facts indicating that this
reaction was a result of the selective disclosure. Id. At that point, even though the officer's
original selective disclosure was not intentional, the issuer has learned that it has made a nonintentional selective disclosure and must make the prompt selective disclosure required under
Regulation FD. Id.; see also Regulation FDI7 C.F.R. §§ 243.100(a)(2), 101(d). Moreover, if the
issuer makes any additional selective disclosures of the information thereafter, these disclosures
would be deemed intentional under the regulation. See Motorola, supra note 212.

232. See id. Whereas in the sweep cases, Commissioner Campos was seeking more severe
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allow a valid reliance on counsel defense as a basis for allowing companies to escape any real sanction in future cases? Definitely not. In the
21(a) Report, the Commission specifically cautioned that where an
"officer knows that the information to be selectively disclosed would be
important to the reasonable investor, he or she cannot seek out and rely
on counsel's consent as a shield against liability. ' 233 The Commission
stated that a company's CFO or IR Director may have a "keener awareness than company counsel of the significance of information to investors," and therefore cautioned that "[c]onsultation with counsel will not
relieve the officer from responsibility for disclosure of information that
he or she personally knows, or is reckless in not knowing, is material
and nonpublic. ' 234 Even more important, the Commission cautioned at
the end of the 21(a) Report that "having now issued this Report," it
"would be less likely in the future to credit reliance on counsel" as a
mitigating factor in future actions.2 35 This was a key warning by the
Commission that the Motorola case did not create a per se reliance on
counsel defense. Instead, the case seemed to signify the Commission's
desire to encourage issuers to seek advice of counsel on issues concerning compliance with the regulation, while also cautioning issuers that
they will not necessarily be able to hide behind the shield of any such
advice in the future when they are in a better position than counsel to
know whether material nonpublic disclosures have been made.
Other significant aspects of the case deal with the guidelines given
by the Commission regarding the definition of materiality, "after-thefact" selective clarifications of prior public disclosures, and the prohibited use of "code" words. Also noteworthy in Motorola, as was seen in
the other cases, was its consideration of the impact on the company's
stock price as a result of the selective disclosures.2 36
VIII.

SCHERING-PLOUGH

Following the Regulation FD sweep in November 2002 came
another changing of the guard at the SEC, with the appointment of a new
Chairman, William H. Donaldson, a person on the record as criticizing
sanctions, and Commissioners Glassman and Atkins were seeking less severe sanctions, in
Motorola the commissioners all concurred with the outcome of a 21(a) Report. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See id. The Commission stated that "[b]etween March 6 and March 12 - the period of
the phone calls at issue - the price of Motorola stock declined from $17.70 to $15.00, a drop of
more than 15%." Id. "There were also significant increases in trading volume of Motorola stock
at most of the firms where analysts were contacted." Id.
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the regulation. But as Donaldson's actions would later reveal, he was
not necessarily an opponent of the regulation.
A.

The Donaldson Factor: Skeptic or Supporter?

In November 2002, amid a politicized and stormy tenure at the
SEC, Harvey Pitt announced his resignation, and the following month
President Bush named William H. Donaldson to chair the agency.23 7
Donaldson, co-founder of the investment bank Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette and former head of the New York Stock Exchange, was someone deemed by many who could bring a wealth of experience to the
SEC.2 38 Yet, as the political forces in Washington evaluated and scrutinized Bush's choice to head the SEC, a position vital in restoring badly
needed investor confidence during a time of scandal, Donaldson's previous negative statements about the regulation began to surface.
One of the first criticisms leveled against Donaldson, after his nomination but before his confirmation, concerned his previous criticisms of
Regulation FD.2 39 In an interview approximately a year before his nomination, Donaldson had been quoted as calling Regulation FD a "terrible
rule."24 Referring to the chilling effect associated with the regulation,
he opined that the rule was "crazy in terms of what it does to the free
flow of information." 24 ' He said the regulation was "paralyzing com'
munications between analysts and companies. "242
The media reported on Donaldson's past statements, and some considered him an opponent of the regulation. 24 3 His potential views thus
became a topic of concern for investors, as they began to wonder what
Donaldson's chairmanship would mean for the regulation . 44 Some
went so far as to look at Donaldson's previous statements on the regulation and question whether he was reform-minded and sufficiently quali237. See Kathleen Day, President Names Insider to Lead SEC; Donaldson Headed N.Y. Stock
Exchange, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2002, at Al.

238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See Justin Schack, The Pioneers, INST. INVESTOR, Oct. 1, 2001, at 104.

241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See Day, supra note 237, at Al; Daniel Dunaief, SEC Nominee Under Fire, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Dec. 12, 2002, at 67; Greg Farrell, Bush Picks Polar Opposite of Pitt to Take Over at SEC;
Donaldson Seen as Warm and Smooth, USA TODAY, Dec. 11, 2002, at B 1; Neal Lipschutz, Point
of View: Disclosurefor New SEC Head More Than FD, Dow JONES NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 12,

2002.
244. Rob Wells, SEC Nominee Donaldson: FairDisclosure Rule 'Terrible,' Dow JONES INT'L
NEWS, Dec. 11, 2002. Yet some questioned Donaldson's ability to change the regulation even if
he wanted to, in light of the reform movement to clean up Wall Street in the wake of Enron and
other corporate scandals. See Tony Cooke, Swimming Against the Tide Is Tough, Dow JONES
CORPORATE FILINGS ALERT, Dec. 16, 2002; Dunaief, supra note 243, at 67.
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fled to lead the agency during the scandalous times in the
marketplace.24 5
Against this backdrop, Donaldson went before the Senate Banking
Committee on February 5, 2003, for his confirmation hearing, where he
faced, among other things, questions concerning his views on the regulation.246 During the hearing, Donaldson expressed his support for the
regulation, and stated that he would not propose changing it.247 Saying
his prior statements had been "taken out of context," he added that he
was "totally for the intention of the law" and felt that the regulation was
"working better" since the time he had made his comments.2 4 8 He nevertheless vowed as chairman to "constantly monitor the implementation"
of the regulation and make sure that it was not having unintended
consequences.249
B.

Schering-Plough

A month later, in March 2003, Schering-Plough Corporation
announced that the SEC's staff planned to recommend action against the
company and its CEO under Regulation FD.25 ° While Donaldson proclaimed himself a supporter of the regulation, everyone knew that
actions would speak louder than words, and the Schering-Plough matter
was closely watched to see whether the previous skeptic of the regulation would indeed become a supporter.2
On September 9, 2003, the Commission brought and filed two settled enforcement proceedings: an administrative proceeding against
Schering-Plough and its former CEO, and a civil proceeding against the
company, hitting the corporation with a one million dollar civil penalty,
and the CEO with a fifty-thousand dollar civil penalty, the first of its
245. See Justin Schack, Thus Spake Bill Donaldson, INST. INVESTOR, Jan. 1, 2003; Wall Street
in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2002, at A38.
246. See Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Choice Says He's No Harvey Pitt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003,

at Cl.
247. See id.
248. See Neal Lipschutz, Point of View: Donaldson Is Now Okay with Regulation FD, Dow
JONES NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 6, 2003. Saying his previous quotes concerning the regulation had
been "taken out of context," Donaldson stated that "his initial reaction was I thought it was crazy,
because, at that time, I was chairman of a major U.S. corporation that was trying to deal with the
implementation of it, and I was in the throes, at that time, thinking there were some unintended
consequences." Id. Stating that he was in favor of the law, he nevertheless said that "at that time
there were some unintended consequences that were having just the reverse effect, shutting down

information flow." Id.
249. Id.
250. See Kathleen Day, Schering-Plough, CEO May Face SEC Charges, WASH. POST, Mar.
13, 2003, at E2. It was reported that on March 11, 2003, the SEC gave the company a Wells
notice informing the company that the SEC staff planned to recommend that the Commission
bring a civil action against the company and its chief executive officer. Id.
251. See id.
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kind against an individual for violations of Regulation FD.2 52 Specifically, the Commission brought a federal civil action in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia charging Schering-Plough
with violating Regulation FD and section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and
seeking a monetary penalty of one million dollars.25 3 The Commission
simultaneously issued an administrative order likewise finding that
Schering-Plough had violated the regulation and section 13(a), and additionally finding that the company's former chairman and CEO, Richard
J. Kogan, was a cause of Schering-Plough's violations.25 4
In the proceedings, the Commission charged that during the week
of September 30, 2002, the CEO and Schering-Plough's vice president
for investor relations met privately in Boston with analysts and portfolio
managers of four institutional investors, three of which were among
Schering's largest investors. 5 At the meetings, "through a combination
of spoken language, tone, emphasis, and demeanor," the CEO disclosed
negative material nonpublic information concerning the company's
earnings prospects, including information revealing that the analysts'
earnings estimates for the company's 2002 third-quarter were too high
and that the company's 2003 earnings would significantly decline.25 6
252. Schering-PloughCorp., Exchange Act Release No. 48,461, Admin. Proceeding File No.
3-11,249 (Sept. 9, 2003); SEC Files Settled Regulation FD Charged Against Schering-Plough
Corp. and its Former Chief Executive, Litigation Release No. 18,330, Case No. 1:03CV01880
(D.D.C.) (CKK) (Sept. 9, 2003).
253. Id. Without admitting or denying the Commission's allegations and findings, ScheringPlough consented to the entry of a final judgment requiring it to pay a one million dollar civil
penalty. Id.
254. Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 48,461, Admin. Proceeding File No.
3-11,249 (Sept. 9, 2003). Without admitting or denying the Commission's allegations and
findings, Kogan agreed to a fifty-thousand dollar civil penalty in the administrative proceedings,
and both Schering-Plough and Kogan agreed to entry of the Commission's cease-and-desist order.
Id.
255. See id. The four institutional investors were Wellington Management Company
("Wellington"), Massachusetts Financial Services Company ("MFS"), Fidelity Management &
Research Company ("Fidelity"), and Putnam Investments ("Putnam"). Id. Wellington, Fidelity,
and Putnam were Schering-Plough's largest investors. Id.
256. See id. On September 30, 2002, the CEO and Schering-Plough's investor relations officer
had a dinner meeting with Wellington's pharmaceutical analyst and several of Wellington's
portfolio managers, during which the CEO informed them that Schering-Plough was going to take
a "hard hit" to 2003 earnings, that he did not favor having the company repurchase its own shares,
that the company's manufacturing costs would increase in 2003, and that no significant costs cuts
were planned. Id. The following day, the CEO and the investor relations officer met with the
pharmaceutical analyst and several portfolio managers at MFS, and the CEO informed them that
2003 was going to be a "very, very difficult" year for the company, and that "the street" had not
significantly lowered earnings estimates for the third quarter of the third quarter of the company's
2002 fiscal year. Id. The CEO also stated that he did not favor the company repurchasing its own
shares. Id. Following the meeting, the CEO and investor relations officer then met with the
pharmaceutical analyst and several portfolio managers for Fidelity. Id. At this meeting, the CEO
stated that 2003 would be a "tough" or "difficult" year for the company's earnings, that the
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Immediately after the meetings, analysts at two of the firms downgraded
their ratings on the company, and portfolio managers at three of the
firms dumped their Schering-Plough stock. 5 7 Following the down-

grades and selloff, the company's stock price plunged by more than seventeen percent during the course of a three day period, from $21.32 to

$17.64 per share, on almost four times normal volume.

8

On October 3,

2002, while Schering-Plough stock was still actively being sold off, the
CEO held a previously scheduled private meeting with approximately
twenty-five analysts and portfolio managers at Schering-Plough's headquarters, during which he informed them, among other things, that his
company's 2003 earnings would be "terrible.."25 9 Later that evening, the
company issued a press release that provided earnings guidance for 2002
and 2003 materially below analysts' consensus estimates and, with
respect to the 2002 fiscal year, materially below the company's own
prior earnings guidance for that year.2 60
The Commission found that Schering-Plough violated Regulation
FD, and that the CEO caused the violations, when the company provided
earnings guidance containing material nonpublic information in private
meetings with institutional investors and analysts, and failed to publicly
disclose such information as required by the regulation.2 6 ' The Commission found that, even though the CEO's purpose may not have been
to "suggest that institutional investors sell" Schering-Plough stock, "his
company would not be significantly cutting costs in 2003, and that the company's gross margins
would be negatively impacted by the sale of more royalty-based products and increased
manufacturing expenses. Id. Following the meeting with Fidelity, the CEO and investor relations
officer then met with the pharmaceutical analyst and numerous portfolio managers at Putnam. Id.
At this meeting, the CEO provided material nonpublic information concerning revenues of one of
its products, and indicated that Wall Street consensus earnings estimates for the third quarter of
the company's 2002 fiscal year were too high. Id. All of these statements made to Wellington,
MFS, Fidelity, and Putnam were materially different from the company's prior public disclosures,
and thus resulted in selective disclosures in violation of Regulation FD. Id.
257. See id. Fidelity and Putnam downgraded their ratings on Schering-Plough. Id. The
portfolio managers at Fidelity, Putnam, and Wellington heavily sold off their holdings of
Schering-Plough stock. Id. Fidelity and Putnam each sold more than ten-million shares over a
three-day period after the meetings, their sell-off accounting for more than thirty percent of the
overall market during that period. Id.
258. Id. The volume topped twenty million shares traded per day compared with the
company's average volume of less than five million shares traded per day. Id.
259. Id. The October 3 meeting was neither webcast nor accessible to the public. Id. In the
session, the CEO told the analysts that "next year will be tough, real tough," and that the
company's earnings would be "terrible." Id. The CEO also said the company's gross margins
would deteriorate because of royalty expenses and manufacturing spending. Id.
260. See id. The company issued the press release after it received numerous press inquiries
concerning whether the CEO had actually used the word "terrible" in describing 2003 earnings.
Id.
261. See id.
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conduct failed to meet the requirements" of the regulation. 6 2 The
CEO's "statements, demeanor and general expressions of concern" for
his company's "prospects" during private meetings amounted to selective disclosure and prompted a significant selloff in the company
stock. 63
The Commission stated that the one-million dollar penalty against
Schering-Plough was the largest penalty ever obtained for a violation of
the regulation, and that the penalty against the CEO was the first civil
penalty ever obtained against an individual for violation of the regulation. 2 61 Reflecting similar dissent to the imposition of a civil penalty in
Siebel, Commissioner Atkins dissented to the imposition of a penalty
against Schering-Plough in the civil action.265
SIGNIFICANCE OF CASE

The most significant aspect of the case is that it was a sign from the
Commission that the regulation was here to stay. The Commission
slammed Schering-Plough and its CEO with heavy penalties after the
Commission had, through the sweep cases, put the market on notice that
it would indeed enforce the regulation, Chairman Donaldson did not
appear to pull any punches in his first chance to enforce the regulation.
Instead of backing off or mitigating any civil penalties sought, as Commissioner Atkins in his dissent appears to have wanted, Chairman Donaldson and the Commission as a whole came down hard in the first real
case brought in a new Regulation FD enforcement world.
The civil penalties sought in Schering-Plough are also very significant. The one-million dollar penalty obtained against the company is
four times that of the only civil penalty in the sweep cases, the twohundred-fifty-thousand dollar penalty in Siebel. This signals a new
trend that companies will be hit and hit hard when they run afoul of the
rule, and it is conceivable that seven- or eight-figure civil penalties may
well rule the day in future cases when companies cross the line in violation of the regulation.
Another significant aspect of the case involves the fifty-thousand
dollar civil penalty against the CEO, the first ever against an individual
262. Id.
263. See id. The Commission stated that "[t]hese communications are precisely the kind of
selective disclosures that Regulation FD was designed to prevent." Id.
264. See SEC Files Regulation FD Charges Against Schering-Plough Corporation and Its
Former Chief Executive, SEC Release 2003-109 (Sept. 9, 2003). In bringing the case, SEC
Enforcement Director Stephen M. Cutler warned that "[b]estowing an information advantage on a
select few at the expense of others undermines investors confidence and cannot be tolerated." id.
265. See Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 48,461, Admin. Proceeding File
No. 3-11,249 (Sept. 9, 2003).
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for violations of the regulation. This reveals for the first time that the
Commission is willing to impose a civil penalty on individuals for causing their companies to violate the regulation. Not only was the civil
penalty the first for an individual, it is also, in my opinion, most likely
the beginning of an enforcement trend in which the SEC will hold individuals monetarily accountable for violations of the regulation as a result
of their actions. And like the first corporate civil penalty in Siebel for
two-hundred-fifty-thousand dollars, which jumped fourfold to one-million dollars in Schering-Plough, it is quite conceivable that the fiftythousand dollar civil penalty against the CEO in Schering-Plough will
be a low baseline figure and that future civil penalties against senior
officials who cause their companies to run afoul of the regulation will be
much higher.
It is also significant that the Commission looked at the CEO's
"statements, demeanor and general expressions of concern" for his company's earnings prospects in determining that he had disclosed material
nonpublic information.26 6 The case did not involve a straightforward
confirmation or denial of earnings estimates, rather the Commission
looked at "a combination of spoken language, tone, emphasis, and
demeanor" in finding that the CEO disclosed material nonpublic information concerning the company's earnings prospects.2 6 7 In its legal
analysis, the Commission went so far as to cite Motorola to confirm the
rule that "[i]ssuers may not evade the public disclosure requirements of
Regulation FD by using 'code' words or 'winks and nods' to convey
material nonpublic information during private conversations." 268 Schering-Plough thus fortifies the notion that all forms of communication
used in disseminating selective information to investors may cause
senior officials to cross the line and cause the company to violate the
regulation.
It also illustrates that senior officials need to be very careful when
speaking with covered persons under the regulation, for almost anything
they say, not already in the public domain, can land them in big trouble,
especially when it relates to concerns or factors relevant to earnings
information. The Commission in Schering-Plough, while acknowledging that the company and CEO "were free to convey the serious concerns they had over Schering's earnings prospects to industry
professionals," warned that the company could not selectively do so as it
"had a legal obligation to disseminate that information to the rest of the

266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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marketplace in accordance with Regulation FD. ' 2 69 Therefore, corporate officers need to be mindful that their statements may unintentionally
create a selective disclosure situation when taken in conjunction with
certain mannerisms and other statements made when disseminating
information bordering on selective disclosure.2 7 °
Schering-Plough signaled that future enforcement of the regulation
will be stricter, with less tolerance for questionable deviations, and
likely to involve heavier penalties. The weight of the sanctions in
Schering-Plough,coming on the heels of the initial sweep cases, should
serve as a warning to corporations and their officers that they must be
more prudent in complying with the regulation because they can and
will get hit with an enforcement action if they violate the regulation.
IX.

FUTURE SURVIVAL AND ENFORCEMENT OF REGULATION

FD

Several lessons can be learned from the story of the regulation's
fight for survival and the subsequent enforcement actions under it. The
regulation will survive and become a core regulation in the federal
securities laws. And future enforcement actions will involve stricter
interpretations of the regulation, as well as stiffer sanctions, now that the
corporate community has been put on notice by the Commission.
A.

Regulation FD Will Survive Relatively Unchanged and Become
an Essential Rule in the Federal Securities Laws

The regulation will survive and become an essential part of the
securities laws. Schering-Plough confirmed that, with its seven-figure
sanction and its novel action against an individual. If the regulation was
going to have been substantially modified or repealed, it would have
happened during its earlier days, when there was hardcore resistance to
it. The regulation has survived an initial attack by a very influential
opponent, the very securities industry that had benefited from the old
system of selective disclosure. The regulation also has survived a severe
bear market for which some had held it partially responsible. Weather269. Id.
270. See id. In Schering-Plough, the Commission looked carefully at how the meetings with
the CEO and his statements were interpreted. Id. Besides looking at the statements' obvious
market effect on price, the Commission cited several reports by the covered persons who had
heard the statements and cited their interpretations of the information they had heard. Id. For
example the Commission cited one Fidelity analyst, who downgraded the stock following his
meeting with the CEO, as stating in a report within his company that the meeting "made me think
that 2003 guidance will be worse than expected and could come on the Q3 earnings call in
October." Id. The Commission had also cited a Putnam analyst, who likewise downgraded the
stock following his meeting with the CEO, as noting that "[w]hile [the CEO] was not explicit, the
very interesting meeting left us with the impression that numbers for consensus certainly had been
too high for the quarter and for 2003." Id.
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ing all that, the rule has become embedded as a fundamental regulation
within the federal securities laws, and it is therefore doubtful that the
regulation will be repealed or modified in the foreseeable future.
While there are still those who wish for a bright-line definition of
materiality under the rule, it is very difficult to provide such a definition
without significantly limiting the scope of the regulation. The Commission has resisted providing bright-line definitions of materiality in the
past, because many of the situations in which materiality is an issue are
extremely fact- and circumstance-based. Providing a bright-line rule
could exclude certain kinds of conduct that the regulation was designed
to prevent. For the regulation to adapt to the future, when the market
structure and financial products offered may be very different than what
they are today, it will need to be broad enough to prevent selective disclosures, regardless of shape or form, when such disclosures involve the
dissemination of material nonpublic information. The regulation as currently drafted should be left alone so that it will be able to stand the test
of time, much as the Securities Act of 1933 and Exchange Act of 1934
have done since the days of the Great Depression.
B.

Future Enforcement Actions

The Regulation FD sweep cases were a shot across the bow regarding the Commission's enforcement of the regulation. The sanctions
were relatively mild, and the cases were more notable for providing
enforcement guidelines under the regulation than for punishing companies for violating it. Nevertheless, Schering-Plough signaled a more
stringent position by the Commission in dealing with violations of the
regulation.
1.

STIFFER SANCTIONS IN THE FUTURE

As evidenced by Schering-Plough,the Commission has shown that
it is willing to seek stiffer sanctions for violations of the regulation.
Once the Commission brought its first series of cases, and effectively
put the marketplace on notice that it planned to enforce the rule, it confirmed in Schering-Plough that it would slap companies with larger
sanctions for violations in the future. Likewise, Schering-Plough was
the first case in which the Commission obtained civil monetary penalties
against an individual who caused a company's violation, thus putting the
corporate governance world on notice as to the Commission's enforcement position relating to individuals. Now that corporate officers are on
notice, civil monetary penalties against such individuals may become
larger in future cases. It is doubtful that there will be future cases such
as Secure Computing, where the Commission faulted the company and
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its CEO for intentionally making a selective disclosure and then merely
slapped the company and CEO with administrative cease and desist
orders. 27' Instead, as Schering-Ploughillustrates, companies and senior
who violate of the regulation will do so at their own financial
officials
2
27

cost.

2.

MISTAKES BY COMPANIES AND THEIR SENIOR OFFICIALS ARE LESS

LIKELY TO BE TOLERATED

Seeking to calm the marketplace's initial apprehension about the
regulation, Commission officials stressed time and time again that it
would not be seeking enforcement actions against companies and
officers who attempted to comply with the regulation in good faith.27 3
In the period immediately after the rule's enactment, the Commission
wanted to thaw any potential chilling of issuer communications as a
result of the regulation and to ease corporate fears about compliance
with the rule. However, now that the regulation has become embedded
in the federal securities laws and corporations have had time to figure
out and adjust to the regulation's requirements, it will be harder for companies and their senior officials to avoid the consequences of violations.
In the sweep cases, most of the companies and their senior officials
received relatively light sanctions - and in Motorola, no real sanction
at all - more or less because of mistaken interpretations of the regulation or a lack of internal communication. However, it is doubtful that
such mistakes and or unintended violations will be treated as lightly in
the future. And Siebel, the only sweep case involving a monetary penalty, illustrates the Commission's willingness to bring an action against
a company where a violation may have resulted from a lack of communication within an organization.27 4

3.

RELIANCE ON COUNSEL DEFENSE LESS LIKELY IN THE FUTURE

Counsel, both in-house and external, will need to be sharp on the
regulation in order to protect issuers from violating it. Motorola illus271. See Secure Computing, supra note 166. The Commission in Secure Computing made
clear that it would not tolerate ignorance on the part of senior officials when they are told that
their selective disclosures involve the dissemination of material nonpublic information. Id.
272. See Schering-PloughCorp., Exchange Act Release No. 48,461, Admin. Proceeding File
No. 3-11,249 (Sept. 9, 2003); SEC Files Settled Regulation FD Charged Against Schering-Plough
Corp. and its Former Chief Executive, Litigation Release No. 18,330, Case No. 1:03CV01880
(D.D.C.) (CKK) (Sept. 9, 2003).
273. See supra notes 139-47 and accompanying discussion.
274. See In the Matter of Siebel Systems, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 46896 (Nov. 25,
2002).
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trated that good faith reliance on counsel could be a mitigating factor.175
The case also emphasized, however, that a reliance on counsel argument
will be less tolerated in the future. Noting that it encouraged "honest,
carefully considered attempts" at compliance with the regulation, the
Commission warned that "reliance on counsel will not necessarily provide a successful defense in future cases. '2 76 The Commission stressed
that the "availability of any reliance on counsel" defense would turn on
"all the facts and circumstances" of a case. 77 It then stated that
"[c]learly, in cases where relevant facts are concealed from counsel, or
where counsel's advice was not faithfully given and followed, there will
not be a valid reliance on counsel argument. 2 78 In particular, in cases
where corporate officers know that information to be selectively disclosed would be important to reasonable investors, then such information would be deemed material, and corporate officers will not be able to
"seek out and rely" on counsel's advice or consent as a "shield against
liability" under the regulation. 279 The Commission also determined that,
given that senior officials in many cases may have a better awareness of
the significance of information to be disclosed than counsel, consultation
with counsel under such circumstances will not relieve the company and
its senior officials "from responsibility for disclosure of information"
that they personally know, or are reckless in not knowing, is material
and nonpublic.2 8 °
These comments by the Commission suggest that a company's
senior officials often may be better judges of what is or is not material
than counsel. In such cases, senior officials will not be able to pass off
materiality questions to counsel and then later make a valid reliance on
counsel argument. It is my opinion, however, that if senior officials
have obtained competent counsel and have provided counsel with all of
the relevant information necessary for counsel to render a fully informed
materiality judgment call, then the senior officials, irrespective of the
extensiveness of their knowledge, may still be able to assert a valid reliance on counsel defense.
X.

RECOMMENDED CORPORATE CONDUCT IN LIGHT OF
RECENT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

While an enumeration of the policies and procedures that corpora275. See Report of Investigation Pursuantto Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934: Motorola, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 46898 (Nov. 25, 2002).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.

279. Id.
280. Id.
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tions should implement in seeking compliance with the regulation is
beyond the scope of this Article, two basic procedures should, in my
view, receive special attention in light of recent enforcement actions by
the SEC. First, companies need to have corporate counsel intensively
involved in materiality judgment calls in order to protect themselves.
Second, companies need to have strong procedural systems in place in
order to prevent violations of the regulation.
A.

Counsel Needs to be Intensively Involved in
Materiality Judgment Calls

For a company to protect itself, it will need to retain competent
counsel and provide such counsel with all information necessary to
properly render legal advice. Fully informed legal advice on the materiality of selective disclosures will do two things. First, it will allow the
company to comply with the regulation and stay clear of any issues that
could warrant enforcement action. Second, in my opinion, such legal
advice may, in specific circumstances, provide the company with a good
faith reliance on counsel defense.
1.

COMPANIES NEED TO ENSURE THEY RECEIVE COMPETENT
ADVICE FROM COUNSEL

For a company to protect itself from liability under the regulation,
or to be able to invoke a reliance on counsel defense in seeking to mitigate liability for violations of the regulation, the company needs to retain
competent counsel and give such counsel all information necessary to
render competent advice. Then, and only then, might a company be
deemed to have relied in good faith on counsel's advice. Two steps are
involved. First, the company will need to obtain competent counsel,
either in-house or outside, who is knowledgeable about the regulation
and about materiality in general. Second, the company will need to provide counsel with all relevant information to allow such counsel to make
a fully informed judgment on the materiality of any relevant disclosures. 2 8 ' This may, in my opinion, allow the company to rely on counsel's expertise in the law of the regulation, rather than on counsel's
knowledge of the facts, which, if limited, would not support a reliance
on counsel defense. This is especially true for external counsel, who
may not be as knowledgeable about the company as in-house counsel.
281. The Commission has cautioned that "if consultation with counsel merely results in
counsel reciting the legal standard for materiality and asking the chief financial officer's or
investor relation officer's opinion whether a reasonable investor would consider the information
significant, then the resulting judgment is really the company officer's, not counsel's." Id.
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IN-HOUSE VERSUS EXTERNAL COUNSEL

The position of counsel rendering advice can be an important factor
in materiality judgment calls. In-house counsel is usually in a better
position than external counsel to make materiality judgment calls, as inhouse counsel is more intimately involved with the company and its
senior officials and thus will have a sharper knowledge of the disclosures at issue. However, as Motorola illustrates, in-house counsel can
still make the wrong calls.2 82 Therefore, companies, in order to protect
themselves and accrue the full benefit of their in-house legal staff, need
to continuously train in-house counsel on the regulation. Likewise, inhouse counsel will need to ensure that they are intricately involved in all
situations in which selective disclosures will be made, which will give
in-house counsel the knowledge base necessary to render the appropriate
materiality judgment call. In tough calls concerning materiality, inhouse counsel may want to use external counsel as a second source or
backup for its own decisions regarding materiality. This use of external
counsel will serve as further protection for the company, and provide
further evidence of adequate reliance on counsel, should a problem arise.
The use of external counsel, instead of internal counsel, can also
protect the company from liability under the regulation. Again, assuming competent counsel is retained, it is important to make sure external
counsel is fully informed of all facts and circumstances underlying a
selective disclosure. The Commission has warned that senior officials
will not be able to rely on counsel for materiality questions when the
senior officials have a "keener awareness" than counsel of the significance of disclosed information to investors.2 83 As it will be difficult to
substitute external counsel's knowledge for that of a CEO or CFO in
assessing the significance of certain kinds of information, external counsel particularly will need to be informed of all relevant facts and circumstances underlying a selective disclosure in order to render the kind of
legal advice that will allow the company to make a reliance on counsel
defense in the future.
Regardless of whether in-house or external counsel is used in rendering a materiality judgment call, it is important that the company
adhere to counsel's advice. If there is a pattern of intermittent disregard
of counsel's advice on selective disclosure issues, the company would
not arguably be relying on counsel's advice, and instead could be
deemed to have been making materiality judgment calls on its own.
Likewise, if counsel is only broadly informed of selective disclosure
282. Id.
283. Id.
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issues or serves only to rubberstamp selective disclosures the company
considers important, then counsel will not have been properly rendering
advice on the selective disclosure issues.
B.

Companies Need Strong Procedural Systems to Prevent
Violations of the Regulation

In the future, it will be more difficult for companies to attribute
violations of the regulation to error on the part of their senior officials.
The Commission made important statements in Raytheon, Secure Computing, and Schering-Plough when it charged the companies for violations resulting from the actions of their senior officials. And the
Commission made an even more blunt statement when it brought an
action exclusively against the company in Siebel for actions by the company's employees that, when combined, created a violation of the regulation and attributed liability to the company. In light of the fact that the
Commission has not shown any reluctance to bring actions against corporations based on the conduct of their senior officials or, in the case of
Siebel, based on the concerted conduct by their senior officials, companies need to be careful to avoid violations of the regulation by all of
their employees. This is especially true in light of the fact that the Commission has stressed in Motorola that reliance on counsel will "not necessarily provide a successful defense" in "future cases. '"284 Therefore,
companies need to ensure that they have systems in place that will prevent all kinds of selective disclosures prohibited by the regulation.
While the specific policies and procedures issuers should implement will need to be thorough and tailored to the corporation's management structure, it is safe to say in light of the recent enforcement cases
that such policies and procedures should address at least a few basic
components. First, the policies and procedures should be designed to
prevent any kind of selective disclosure by any one senior official, or
concerted actions by multiple senior officials. This might be accomplished by instituting safeguards that require the screening of all proposed communications by senior officials to covered persons before the
communications are made. This would serve to not only ensure that
material nonpublic information will not be intentionally disclosed, but
will also serve to inform, as well as remind, senior officials of their
obligations under the regulation when entering into selective communications. In matters involving conference calls to multiple covered persons, such as analysts, the screening should also involve a confirmation
as to whether the conference call will or will not be simultaneously
284. Id.
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broadcast to the public. If it will be broadcast to the public, then safeguards should established to ensure that public notice has been made of
the conference call, via a press release, before the senior official speaks.
Likewise, if it turns out that the conference call will not be broadcast to
the public, then the senior official should be made aware of that fact
beforehand so a Siebel situation does not develop, where the senior official mistakenly believed that his remarks were being disseminated publicly. Another safeguard would be to have legal counsel present during
all selective disclosures made to covered persons, regardless of whether
the disclosures were designed to be disseminated to the public or private,
or whether the information to be provided could be considered material
or non-material. This would serve again as a reminder to the senior
official of his or her obligations under the regulation and would give
counsel the opportunity to immediately intervene if a non-intentional
selective disclosure is made.
XI.

CONCLUSION

The story of Regulation FD's survival in the face of powerful opposition, and against the backdrop of a grueling bear market, is the tale of
how one of the greatest securities rules of modern times ultimately prevailed. Just as it took the Crash and the Great Depression to lead to the
calls for market regulation that resulted in the Securities Act of 1933 and
Exchange Act of 1934, it took the recent corporate scandals involving
Enron and others to beat back the securities industry's fierce resistance
to Regulation FD.
Now that Regulation FD is a permanent fixture in the securities
laws, with no real threat of being modified or repealed, recent enforcement actions have provided the corporate community with a better
understanding of what conduct is prohibited under the regulation. The
recent actions also have granted issuers the knowledge base necessary to
fine-tune their corporate disclosure practices. Issuers should now be in a
better position to confidently comply with the regulation, without fear of
SEC enforcement repercussions. With a corporate atmosphere more
adjusted to the compliance obligations under Regulation FD, the practice
of selective disclosure, as it existed prior to 2000, will hopefully end
once and for all.

